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This study represents an attempt to address some of the 
philosophical inadequacies that underlie the use of 
instructional media in American public schools. By using as 
a starting point the works of the writers in the curriculum 
field who have become known as the •reconceptualists,· 
research will range quite far outside the traditional 
boundaries. From social, legal, and political issues, to 
the abstractions of the Frankfurt School and Freud's 
psychodynamics, a line of argumentation will be developed 
that reappraises the theoretical foundations of the field of 
instructional media. 
It is possible that the indiscriminate use of 
instructional media as a teaching device may inadvertently 
interfere with the development of some students by its 
participation in conflict resolution at the site of the ego. 
When understood from a philosophical vantage point other 
than the current dominant one, it may be concluded that the 
use of instructional media in the classroom should be 
limited until more is known about the manner in which the 
individual learner experiences media. 
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This paper represents an attempt to identify some of 
the foundations necessary for a critical reappraisal of the 
field of instructional media. For reasons detailed below, 
this investigation will proceed from a psychoanalytic per-
spective. Because the field is without a history of research 
of this type, it will be necessary to range outside the tra-
ditional boundaries defined by the history of instructional 
media and its roots in the behaviorist psychologies. Impli-
cations for instructional media will be drawn from sources 
in philosophy, sociology, psychology, and political science 
to create the argumentation for a reassessment of the role 
instructional media plays in instructional design in Ameri-
can public education. 
Admittedly, there are a variety of design schemes that 
separately represent valid means for selecting and arranging 
information for instructional purposes.1 Typically, "in-
structional media" is defined as a component of such schemes 
and used as a delivery system to facilitate reaching in-
structional objectives which have been stated behaviorally~ 
It will be asked here, however, whether the individual 
teacher who conceives of instructional media solely within 
1 
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the parameters of goal-oriented teaching strategies may 
inadvertently overlook the fact that the manner in which a 
child experiences media in the classroom aay directly or 
indirectly impact that child's development regardless of the 
content of the lnstructlon. This ls the central question of 
this paper. 
In considering the use of media in an instructional 
setting there are three areas of concern: 
1. that which ls being influenced, i.e. the mental 
structure of a child and how that structure ac-
commodates data; 
2. the influencing stimuli, i.e. that which converges 
upon this structure; 
3. the influencing process, i.e., the alterations that 
occur in the child's mind ln response to these 
3 stimuli. 
The first concern traditionally has been the province of 
educational psychologists, while the second and third have 
been the object of instructional designers and psycho-
therapists, respectively. Typically, the third area has 
been ignored by those who use media in public schools. 
The field of instructional media has developed in 
conjunction with the systems approach to instructional 
design, predominantly with regard to the structure and 
delivery of influencing stimuli based upon a conception of 
the learner that has been created by psychologists of the 
behaviorlst-associationist schools of thought.4 The result 
3 
has been the virtual omission of any serious consideration 
of the nature of the internal experience Cina psycho-
analytic sense> of the individual who experiences communi-
cations delivered via a given medium. This paper represents 
an evolution of thought concerning this omission. Hopefully, 
it culminates in a contribution to the search for the theo-
retical underpinnings for a critical reappraisal of the 
field. 
It ls interesting to note at the start that even if it 
ls established that the field of instructional media has 
Ignored the third area of concern as described above, it 
still may not be readily evident that critique of the role 
media plays in instruction is warranted. The obvious po-
tential for classroom applications of extraordinary techno-
logical advances seems to generate more enthusiasm than 
caution for their use.5 Herbert Marcuse (1966> has stated 
that this phenomena characterizes our whole social system. 
Neither the mechanization and standardization of 
life, nor the mental impoverishment, nor the 
growing destructiveness of present-day progress 
provides sufficient ground for questioning the 
'principle' which has governed the progress of 
Western civilization. The continual increase of 
productivity makes constantly more realistic the 
promise of an even better life for all (pp. 3-4>. 
Where, then, lies the impetus for critique? Chapter II 
will develop a line of reasoning that begins with an assess-
ment of the positivist rationality which infuses instruc-
tional media as an academic discipline, and draw the 
conclusion that critique emanates from the apparent limlta-
4 
tions. An underlying theme for this paper, however, will be 
that critique actually begins in more fundamental ways that 
are not so easily articulated and discussed; that critique 
may begin in thoughtful reflection about the way we educate 
children and the feelings we have about those thoughts. 
For Freud (1961), reflection concerning the technical 
and cultural development of people in civilization neces-
sarily results in unsettling feelings, as he observed in the 
closing paragraph of Civilization~ 1.1.§. Discontents. 
Men have gained control over the forces of nature 
to such an extent that with their help they would 
have no difficulty in exterminating one another to 
the last man. They know this, and hence comes a 
large part of their current unrest, their unhap-
piness and their mood of anxiety Cp.104). 
Perhaps in a similar fashion Cbut on a less grand scale> the 
same anxiety emerges upon recognition of a growing technical 
sophistication of the delivery of instructional information 
and the evaluation of behaviorally stated goals. As we 
become more and more able to regulate the process of in-
struction we develop systems of information delivery that 
are adaptable to specific styles of learning rather than 
specific learners. If the technical design of education 
were perfected, would we exterminate the learner as indivi-
dual? Presumably, a variety of factors function to prevent 
this from ever occurring, but a more realistic question 
emerges: to the extent that technical mastery of the proc-
ess of education has been achieved, what has occurred within 
the individual learner? This is what a reappraisal of the 
the individual learner? This ls what a reappraisal of the 
field of instructional media seeks to discover. 
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The literature in the field typically treats this 
question tangentially. For instance, in a foreword written 
for a collection of essays concerning the translation of 
instructional media theory into practice, Walter K. Beggs, 
then dean of the Teachers College at the University of Ne-
braska, observes that ·Modern man, in short, must learn to 
live in a milieu where change, tension, uncertainty, and 
frustration are endemic <Wiman and Meierhenry, 1969, p. v>.· 
With the enlightened use of instructional media teachers may 
more effectively endow their students with the skills to 
cope with an oppressive world. What Beggs failed to do, 
however, was address the more immediate issue of how 
teachers help students accommodate the same change, tension, 
and frustration within their own learning environments. 
It is understandable that this should be the case. If 
teachers risk reflective consideration of the implications 
of their technology in the classroom they risk personally 
experiencing anxiety of the sort that Freud described. It 
is certainly easier to ignore the issue because current 
praxis offers no satisfying resolution of these feelings. 
For example, consider the classroom teacher who is given 
instructional materials that are prepared by a commercial 
production company or a state agency. If the content of the 
materials meets curriculum objectives, and ls accepted by 
governing agencies and the community, then the teacher may 
6 
be disinclined to analyze the content more carefully for its 
treatment of values, beliefs or actions. Thoughtful reflec-
tion can reveal small Inconsistencies which may be argued as 
overstepping the public interest in education and encroach-
ing upon an individual's private concerns. The border 
between public and private interests ls not at all clear, 
and the teacher who approaches the issue risks the uneasy 
feelings of grappling with problems that seem to defy 
resolution.6 The seduction of technically designed systems 
of instruction ls that they obviate questions of philosoph-
ical import. 
It is undeniable that instruction intrudes into per-
sonal areas of life, and It ls perfectly legitimate, defen-
sible, and desirable that American public education do so 
because of a vested public interest that children learn 
certain things and behave in certain ways. If, however, one 
experiences any concern for the means of such learnings, 
then the choice that confronts educators becomes whether to 
ignore the concern, or seek to deal with it. If the choice 
is for the latter, then the educator is faced with enor-
mously complex questions such as the one posed at the begin-
ning of this chapter regarding the implications for 
individual learners if instructional media ls approached 
from outside its traditional theoretical structure. 
This paper will not answer this question but it will 
attempt to identify a starting point for investigation. As 
mentioned, Chapter II will review the critique of positivist 
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rationality that underlies the use of Instructional media, 
then follow one strand of philosophical thought to suggest 
Freud's theory of psychodynamlcs as a structure for an al-
ternate theory base for the field. The unique nature of 
Freud's theories will be shown to split an investigation of 
the manner in which an individual experiences instructional 
media into two broad approaches: the individual may be de-
fined and understood in terms of society, and in terms of 
self. Chapter III will review the broader social implica-
tions from a legal standpoint, and conclude that the evolu-
tion of Supreme Court decisions vis-~-vis American public 
education precludes definition of instuctional media by 
other than a positivist perspective, thus rendering psycho-
analytic investigations moot. On the other hand, there is 
wide latitude available in the use of instructional media 
when it is understood as a component in interpersonal com-
munication, as Chapter IV will demonstrate. An historical 
review of the general application of psychoanalysis to 
education reveals great confusion as to the meaning of 
Freud's work, but emergent common themes <such as the manner 
in which an individual resolves conflict> point the way for 
application to the use of media in the classroom. As a sup-
plement to Chapter IV, a general review of Freud's theory of 
personality is presented in the Appendix. Chapter V will 
attempt to develop a synthesis of these diverse sources of 
influence to conclude that instructional media may indeed 
participate in personal development. Until these influences 
8 
are better understood, the immediate implications may be for 
restraint in media use for instructional purposes in 
American public schools. 
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This chapter represents an attempt to discover the 
philosophical foundations necessary to begin a reassessment 
of the field of instructional media from a psychoanalytic 
perspective. It will begin with a brief summary of the 
critique of scientific rationality as it has been described 
by some educators. Following that, it will be suggested 
that the work of critical theorist Jurgen Habermas may be 
used to point to Freud's theory of psychodynamics as a 
possible structure for critique of the field. The socio-
logical nature of Freud's work will be reviewed to better 
legitimate its application to the investigation begun here. 
Finally, a framework will be suggested as a starting point 
to guide investigation outside the confines of traditional 
research in instructional media. 
Analysis of the issues surrounding the impact of tech-
nologically advanced instructional media on students is 
often ignored or given only cursory treatment at best within 
the literature. For instance, Heinich, Molenda, and Russell 
<1985, p. 28) note the argument that instructional tech-
nology tends to dehumanize students, then dismiss this fear 
l 1 
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by concluding that dehumanization comes not from the tech-
nology itself but in the way teachers perceive their 
students. ·rn other words, it ls not technology that tends 
to mechanize people but the uses to which people put tech-
nology.• This may have a reassuring ring, but it says 
nothing about what constitutes appropriate uses or why in-
appropriate uses arise. In discussing the implications of a 
scientific system of education, Elliot Elsner (1979> ex-
pressed the opinion that dehumanization does stem from the 
technology itself. 
The technology we design to expand our freedom 
and flexibility becomes our constraint. The 
teacher who does not conceive of the educational 
process as a type of assembly line that processes 
the child in f lelds that are amenable to measure-
ment has no alternative but to adapt to the de-
mands placed on him or her by the school or school 
district, or to leave teaching, or to attempt to 
beat the system by providing the illusion of com-
pliance Cp. 2>. 
It appears the acceptance of this technology has become 
so widespread that it has almost become a part of our 
•common sense" regarding educational praxis. Michael Apple 
(1975> observes 
••• the modes of discourse that curriculum work-
ers and other schoolmen employ often seem to be 
manipulative and deterministic - in the dominance 
of a vulgar behaviorism, for instance, in much of 
our thinking about life in classrooms ... The use 
of such modes of thought also mirrors the remark-
able lack of self-reflectiveness among members of 
the curriculum f leld. That is, our 'habits of 
thought' are exactly that: habits that have be-
come part of our taken- for-granted reality, a re-
ality that has become so commonsensical that we 
have ceased even to question it Cpp. 120 - 121>. 
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As in the curriculum field, the prevailing notion 
within the field of instructional media is that inquiry 
naturally proceeds from a scientific perspective. The 
examination of the role of instructional media within the 
instructional design model from a perspective other than a 
scientific one is an issue that has been discounted by some 
researchers, if the treatment afforded the philosophical 
ramifications of the use of instructional media in teaching 
settings is any measure. For example, Jerrold E. Kemp 
(1985, p. 18) identifies his philosophical orientation 
toward his ten-element plan for instructional design by 
stating "I am designing a program of learning experiences 
for learners so that together we will be successful in 
accomplishing the stated goals and objectives." He con-
tinues by stating that "the resources used make substantial 
contribution to carrying out the activities and accom-
plishing the objectives they were selected to serve (p. 
133)." Because Kemp identifies specific learning outcomes 
before the fact, he grounds his approach in a behaviorist 
model. To state goals and objectives without reference to 
how they are determined is not viewed as problematic. By 
virtue of the total omission of any consideration of al-
ternative modes of inquiry, Kemp presumes a tacit acceptance 
by the reader that his design proceeds from a scientific 
rationality. 
If analysis of the field of instructional media were 
possible from a perspective other than a technical one, it 
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is not immediately apparent from the literature. This is 
not to say that such analysis is not possible, but it is not 
easily initiated because to do so may require moving outside 
the field of education to seek the intellectual foundations 
necessary for meaningful critique of current praxis.1 
important to note at the outset that there are powerful 
forces that act to prevent such exploration. 
It is 
For one, in order to discuss the philosophical or 
emotional impact of the technical nature of instructional 
media it is necessary to use language outside the scientific 
vocabulary. When this happens such comments may be regarded 
as speculative (that is, biased in and of themselves>, and 
dismissed as irrelevant.2 
Another difficulty is found in the illusion of objec-
tivity inherent in scientific models. Essential to the 
scientific method is the opportunity for the unexpected 
discovery and unplanned exploration, and this implies a free 
learning atmosphere conducive to original thought. Within a 
behaviorist model, even those that propose to include ele-
ments of student experimentation, the experiences tend to be 
rigidly controlled so that genuine discovery is not easily 
accomplished. What is described as "scientific instruc-
tional design· is typically "technical instructional 
design." The elements of scientific rationality that would 
insure a school not resemble a factory are routinely left 
behind .3 
A third difficulty lies in the allure of mechanistic 
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approaches which function to safeguard against teacher error 
in the everyday practice of teaching. Elliot Eisner points 
to Edward L. Thorndike as one of the individuals who first 
influenced learning theory in this regard. Eisner (1979, 
p. 6) quotes Thorndike to demonstrate Thorndike,s belief 
that it is possible to "discover the laws of learning so 
that teachers could rely not on intuition, chance, artistry, 
or talent but rather on tested principles and procedures for 
managing the student,s learning.~ Thorndike,s emphasis on 
control led to intricately designed instructional systems 
geared for specific settings. This approach became the 
dominating style of instructional design in education for 
years to come. 
These forces taken together function synergistically to 
form the appeal of technical models of instructional design. 
The allure of objective, technical plans wrapped .in scien-
tif ic verbage could account for the ready acceptance in 1949 
of Ralph Tyler 1 s Basic Principles Qi. Curriculum and Instruc-
tion.5 As one of the most influential works of its kind, it 
is a statement of what seems to be a clear, logical four-
step guide to instructional planning. Tyler intended for 
this to be only a statement of guiding principles, but the 
work was mistakenly interpreted as a literal blueprint for 
6 designing educational experiences. Why was Tyler 1 s work 
taken in this way? Perhaps it is easier to follow a formula 
approach to the implementation of curriculum than to expe-
rience a re-examination of one 1 s fundamental values before 
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beginning to design classroom activities. 
In quoting Gunnar Myrdal, James MacDonald suggests that 
genuine objectivity in curriculum design results when the 
designer is able to escape three pervasive influences: the 
powerful heritage of earlier writings; the influences of the 
entire cultural, social, economic, and political milieu of 
the society where he lives, works, and earns his living and 
status; and the influence stemming from one's own person-
al i ty.7 Certainly this is not accomplished easily. Apple 
(1975) says 
• it may be essential that we - curriculists 
and other educators - devote a major portion of 
our efforts to developing a ·critical science," 
one that will have an emancipatory interest and 
will persistently raise questions concerning the 
dominant demands in education and in other insti-
tutions for bringing all aspects of behavior 
under purposive-rational rubrics of technical 
control so that certainty will be enhanced. We 
must, then, look to other modes of analysis that 
will act as counterbalance to the perspectives 
usually employed in our work (p. 126). 
The proposal that educators develop a critical theory 
of education suggests a review of the work of the critically 
oriented social theorists of the Frankfurt School who have 
written about the permeation of positivistic rationality 
throughout society to the virtual exclusion of all other 
8 forms of knowledge. The existence of body of literature 
that can provide insight into the values underpinning the 
field of education is quite compelling, especially since the 
literature in education generally lacks the theoretical so-
phistication characteristic of literature of the Frankfurt 
17 
School. 
One educator who is using the Frankfurt School to iden-
tify some of the preliminary steps ln developing a critical 
theory for education is Henry Giroux. Giroux <1983, pp. 
14-15) seeks to ·aevelop modes of critique fashioned in a 
theoretical discourse that mediates the possibility for 
social action and emancipatory transformation." He is quick 
to point out that the task of developing a critical theory 
of education is imposing, if only because of the complex 
nature of the writings produced by those associated with the 
Frankfurt School. Moreover, this vast output does not rep-
resent unified thought; rather, it is a collection of ideas 
loosely bound together by agreement in general principles.9 
On the other hand, he observes that even from our current 
vantage point, we can glimpse the enormous effect a fully 
articulated expression of this thought relative to education 
might have. 
While it is impossible to elaborate in any detail 
on the implications of the work of the Frankfurt 
School for a theory of radical pedagogy, I can 
point briefly to some general considerations. I 
believe that it is clear that the thought of the 
Frankfurt School provides a major challenge and a 
stimulus to educational theorists who are critical 
of theories of education tied to functionalist 
paradigms based on assumptions drawn from a posi-
tivist rationality. For instance, against the 
positivist spirit that infuses existing educa-
tional theory and practice, whether it takes the 
form of the Tyler model or various systems ap-
proaches, the Frankfurt School offers an histor-
ical analysis and a penetrating philosophical 
framework that indict the wider culture of posi-
tivism, while at the same time providing insight 
into how the latter becomes incorporated within 
the ethos and practices of schools <p. 34). 
If positivism ls taken as an understanding that the 
meaning of knowledge ls defined by scientific procedures, 
then the technology of education ls acceptable only If the 
scientific interests that legitimate them are acceptable. 
When the Interests of education are expressed within the 
context of scientific inquiry it becomes desirable to be 
able to control for quality and efficiency and to predict 
learning outcomes. If, however, the interests are defined 
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outside this scientific rationality from a philosophical, or 
more specifically, an epistemologlc perspective, then the 
instructional design model can be shown to have llmlta-
tions.10 It appears that in order to communicate effec-
tively about learning theory it ls first necessary to 
identify the underlying interests. MacDonald (1975) 
observes 
• we are often, for example, talking at dif-
ferent value levels and thus miss the whole point 
of each other's thinking. • •. Thus, people have 
either assumed that we all shared the same basic 
perspective, or that you simply could not commun-
icate with certain other persons Cp. 285). 
In this regard, another representative of the Frankfurt 
School, German philosopher Jurgen Habermas, can provide a 
basis for the intellectual argumentation essential to 
seeking a common ground that can help unify the various 
learning paradigms.11 
Habermas states that knowledge cannot be divorced from 
constitutive cognitive interests.12 In so doing, he posits 
alternative but equally valid forms of knowledge, thus 
eliminating the objectlvlst illusion that currently domln-
19 
ates learning theory. This understanding Invalidates one of 
the primary legitimating factors of behavioristic approaches 
to learning which presumes that the acquisition of empirical 
data is the only valid means of research. Habermas (1971> 
identifies three forms, or processes, of inquiry. 
The specific viewpoints from which, with transcen-
dental necessity, we apprehend reality ground 
three categories of possible knowledge: informa-
tion that expands our power of technical control; 
interpretations that make possible the orienta-
tion of action within common traditions; and 
analyses that free consciousness from its depen-
dence on hypostatized powers (p. 313). 
The empirical-analytic sciences pose a context that 
creates rules evaluating statements regarding the creation 
of theories and the assessment of their accuracy. Examples 
of this would be the study of physics or chemistry, as well 
as the social sciences that have adopted a technical ap-
proach. 
In contrast, the historical-hermeneutic sciences gain 
knowledge in a different way. Access to the facts is pro-
vided by the understanding of meaning, not empirical obser-
vation. •the verification of lawlike hypotheses in the 
empirical-analytic sciences has its counterpart here in the 
interpretation of texts <Habermas, p. 309).• This method-
ology, however, is ultimately circular because it eliminates 
from consideration the interpreter's pre-understanding and 
13 in this sense has its own objectivist tendencies. 
From this recognition that particular value sets guide 
the empirical-analytic and historical-hermeneutic sciences, 
20 
Haoermas ldentlf les a thlrd method of lnqulry that seeks to 
transcend the problems of objectlvlsm. 
A critical social science ••• ls concerned with 
going beyond this goal to determine when theoret-
ical statements grasp invariant regularities of 
social action as such and when they express 
ideologically frozen relations of dependence that 
can in principle be transformed CHaoermas, p. 310>. 
The roots for the only adequate psychology for critical 
theory, to date, can be found embodied in the work of Freud 
14 and his process of psychoanalysis. The essence of this 
approach is established by the concept of self-reflection, 
Cthe releasing the subject from dependence on hypostatized 
powers>. In this sense, this approach is "emancipatory• in 
nature. 
The three categories of knowledge constitutive 
interests as defined by Habermas may be summarized as: 
KNOWLEDGE CONSTITUTIVE INTEREST 
Prediction and Control Understanding Emancipation 
Figure 1. Knowledge Constitutive Interests 
Apple sees compelling implications for educators in 
Habermas's work. To suggest that knowledge cannot be di-
vorced from human interest leads us to question the dominant 
demands in education for bringing all aspects of behavior 
under quantifiable, technical control. Rather than pro-
vidlng a vantage point of value-free inquiry, current re-
search ls probably guided by highly specific presumptions. 
Apple (1975> concludes by stating 
••. the search for a process of schooling that 
is less economically, racially, and personally 
oppressive requires a concommitant effort to 
bring to the surface our basic rules and inerests 
so that they may be reconstructed. It may very 
well he the case that the constitutive elements 
of the strict sciences must be subsumed under 
those sciences with an emancipatory image (p. 128>. 
Embedded within Apple's statement, however, ls an 
ambiguity. In stating that our basic rules and interests 
must be brought to the surface, it ls not clear whether 
Apple means those rules and interests that have evolved 
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within our phylogenesis (that is, at the level of society>, 
or those that have been internalized by the individual and 
filtered through one's own unique psychological make-up 
Cone's ontogenesls>. It ls a subtle distinction that is 
difficult to draw because of the continual interrelation 
between the two, hut it ls a distinction that is crucial to 
the premise of this paper. A review of the sociological 
nature of Freud's work clarif les this distinction. 
Freud's sociological perspective differs from others in 
that it is inherently tied to the biological organism of 
human beings through the notion of instincts. The pre-
condition for progress ls the ability of society to check 
this biological nature in favor of goals defined outside the 
individual: civilization begins when the primary objective 
of the individual is renounced. 15 
Freud labels the inhibition of uncontrolled urges as 
the shift from the •pleasure principle· to the •reality 
principle.·16 This is characterized by changes in an 
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individual's value system from emphasis on immediate grati-
f ication to delayed gratification; from play to work; from 
receptiveness to productiveness. Thus, in exchange for the 
security of the group, one is willing to forsake the total 
absence of repression. These principles correspond to some 
extent with Freud's early distinction between the conscious 
and the unconsciousness. The pleasure principle and the 
reality principle represent two distinct mental processes 
existent simultaneously in the individual. 
The interplay between these two processes is of extreme 
importance in Freudian theory. When the pleasure principle 
comes into conflict with the reality principle, the indivi-
dual experiences first the painful fact that all desires 
cannot be gratified, followed by the understanding that the 
reality principle supercedes the pleasure principle. The 
individual learns to substitute immediate gratification for 
the guarantee of satisfaction at some later time. In this 
sense, the reality principle does not destroy the pleasure 
principle; rather, it safeguards it. 17 
The adjustment of pleasure to the reality princi-
ple implies the subjugation and diversion of the 
destructive force of instinctual gratification, 
of its incompatibility with the established so-
cietal norms and relations, and, by that token, 
implies the transubstantiation of pleasure itself 
<Marcuse, 1966, p. 13). 
23 
Through the action of the reality principle, then, the 
animal drives of the individual are transformed into an 
organized ego. The function of reason emerges, and the 
individual strives for "what is useful." The scope of man's 
desires and the means for satisfying them is dramatically 
widened, but the identification of these ends and means are 
external to the subject. In seeking the protection of 
society from his own destructive tendencies, the individual 
exchanges freedom for constraints. For Freud, this is the 
great traumatic event in the development of man, in both the 
genus Cphylogenesis> and the individual Contogenesis>.18 
Phylogenetically, this trauma occurred first when man left a 
state of unrestrained, self-centered motives to form the 
primal horde, a simple society dominated by a patriarch with 
exclusive sexual privileges. In an act of revolt triggered 
by sexual jealousy, the leader was murdered. Freud sug-
gested that the memory of this primal revolt remained re-
pressed in succeeding generations and that many forms of 
primitive rituals were re-enactments of the primal revolt. 
To prevent the actual recurrence of such revolts norms were 
institutionalized as controls. In this manner, the primal 
horde was slowly transformed into civilized society. 
Civilized society manipulates individuals by frus-
trating the individual's instincts and offering other forms 
of satisfaction. The individual is taught the social 
taboos, and through the dominance of the reality principle, 
comes to despise his own instinctual urges and fear the 
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expression of such urges by others. By capitalizing on the 
fear, guilt, and anxiety felt by the subjects of a society, 
great power can be vested in a few leaders. Freud perceived 
a strong parallel between the individual and state, and the 
child and parent. Just as the child ls continuously forced 
into submission to the will of the parent, so is the subject 
compelled to obey the law. 
To continue this analogy, it ls important to note that 
the child learns to regulate his own actions in accordance 
to the admonitions of the parent. In like manner, the re-
pression of the individual by society has been supported by 
repression from within in the form of the superego. Harcuse 
<1966) observes that 
••. the unfree individual introjects his mas-
ters and their commands into his own mental appa-
ratus. The struggle against freedom reproduces 
itself in the psyche of man, as the self-repres-
sion of the repressed individual, and his masters 
and their institutions. It is this mental dynamic 
which Freud unfolds as the dynamic of civilization 
(p. 16). 
To return to Apple's comment, it would appear that the 
rules and interests that make school oppressive operate in 
two ways: directly via the efforts of society to control the 
process of schooling; and indirectly via internalized re-
pression learned and internalized by each person. Analysis 
of the process of schooling must include consideration of 
the nature of repression on two levels: the level of society 
and the level of the individual. 
If artif ical categories may be created for the purpose 
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of analysis, then Figure 1 may be expanded into the matrix 
of Figure 2, illustrating the dominant interests that stem 
from positivistic understandings of education regardless of 
the level of concern. 


















Figure 2. Knowledge Constitutive Interests and Social 
Levels 
Given this distinction between levels, a re-examination 
of Apple's contention that it may be necessary to subsume 
the constitutive elements of the strict sciences to those 
with an emancipatory image may be attempted from the vantage 
of the individual as well as those institutions external to 
the individual. To analyze the values that underpin educa-
tion from a broader social perspective is to treat the issue 
politically; to analyze the question from a personal per-
spective is to treat the issue psychologically. 
Chapter III of this paper will develop the argumenta-
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tion that given the political nature of the institutions 
that form American education, the question of whether pre-
vailing interests can be changed is a moot issue. The evo-
lution of litigation through the American judicial process 
has created a system of power balance that automatically 
precludes any fundamental redesign of the process of public 
education to accommodate emancipatory interests. In 
Freudian terms, the social constraints upon the instincts 
' have evolved to a position of pre-eminence vis-a-vis the 
tangible product of school media. Thus, while it may be 
possible to discuss in theoretical terms any new application 
or understanding of instructional media as it is currently 
employed within the Instructional Design Model, such inves-
tigation is largely meaningless in practical application. 
Conversely, Apple's statement assumes profound pro-
portions if considered exclusively from an individual per-
spective. If, as Haberrnas suggests, Fruedian theory can be 
used as a structured critical theory, then implications 
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Figure 3. Knowledge Constitutive Interests and Social 
Levels - Expanded 
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An authoritarian society, such as a feudal order, pro-
motes submission through the promise of protection, where a 
democracy favors the ideals of independence, self-reliance 
19 and active mastery. Modern America contains elements of 
both and indoctrinates students into the social order by the 
presentation of the potentially contradictory goals of sub-
mission (as patriotism> and self-sufficiency. The indivi-
dual is caught in the perpetual struggle between the demands 
of self and society, and the personal resolution of this 
conflict (for purposes here, conflict resulting from the 
experience of instructional media> tends to be ignored at 
the level of society. 
Such is not the case when instructional media is 
considered at the ontogenic level, for the individual may 
discover through psychotherapy the mechanism of social re-
pression. In this way, knowledge that comes from psycho-
analytic perspectives is emancipatory. 
28 
Two implications emerge for instructional media. For 
one, as suggested above, psychotherapy can provide a means 
of understanding the way repression occurs, and because all 
people share a certain biological commonality, generaliza-
tions about the functioning ~f this mechanism may be pro-
posed. Second, and more importantly, the principles of 
psychoanalysis can provide a means of regulating the exces-
ses of repression. For instance, the influence of external 
forces are experienced at the site of the ego. In an edu-
cational setting this includes the experience of the 
student-teacher relationship in which the teacher provides a 
model with which a child forms a strong attachment. The 
teacher who is distanced from the student by the interven-
tion of instructional media certainly does not jeopardize a 
child in the sense of a mother distancing from her child, 
but the diminishing of that mutuality may hinder the child's 
development of identifications.20 If a child's attention is 
skillfully focused upon, say, a rationally developed lesson 
presented on video tape, then the opportunity for seeking 
the appropriate models and examples for the proper sublima-
tion of the energy of the instinctual urges is diminished, 
and the student is left with an unresolved conflict at the 
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site of the ego. If healthy maturation comes from appro-
priate resolution of this conflict, and it canoe shown that 
the process of experiencing instructional media participates 
actively or passively in the process, then it is appropriate 
to seek to understand the impact of media in psychoanalytic 
terms, and to act in a manner that promotes the emancipatory 
interests of the individual learner. 
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CHAPTER III 
THEORETICAL FOUNDATIONS: LEGAL ASPECTS 
The technical interests that underlie the use of 
instructional media within American public education are 
necessarily dominant as guaranteed by the nature of the 
legal system of the United States when those interests are 
considered at the level of society. Investigation into the 
possibility of subsuming the interests of prediction and 
control to that of emancipation inevitably forces confron-
tation with the physical nature of "media" itself. Whether 
information is delivered via tape, film, or paper, it is 
something that may be taken into a court of law. Once spe-
cific rules are defined that govern the process of legal 
conflict, the definition of media is forced into objective 
terms. In this way, anything introduced into a public 
classroom that is liable to review in a court of law must be 
defensible in technical terms if it is to remain a part of 
the curriculum. If the use of instructional media is NOT 
liable to at least the technical justification that an in-
structional design model affords (that is, if it cannot be 
legitimated as serving objective ends> then it is liable to 
elimination on legal grounds. This chapter traces the evo-
lution of the legal proceedings that have crystalized 
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educational praxis within the limitations of technical ra-
tionality, thus preventing opportunity for implementation of 
media use for emancipatory purposes that are sanctioned at 
the level of society. 
It is important to note that if some use of instruc-
tional media can be shown to serve legitimate objective 
ends, then that media can be studied for its usefulness in 
personal (teacher to student> interaction to serve alternate 
knowledge-constitutive interests, as will be shown in Chap-
ter IV. 
Several of the educators mentioned in Chapters I and 
II, notably Apple, Giroux, and MacDonald, have been asso-
ciated with the "reconceptualists," a term used to refer to 
a group of theorists who have posed quite probing questions 
regarding the nature of knowledge, the role schooling plays 
in the individual,s acquisition of knowledge, and how stu-
dents can better attain liberty, equity and social justice 
1 
through that knowledge. Their critique of orthodox re-
search for its presumption of objectivity coupled with 
common sense thought aligns them with the phenomonological 
view of Husserl, the existentialism of Heidegger, and the 
neo-Marxism of Habermas, all of which form a general cri-
tique of instrumental reason.2 Although there is wide dis-
agreement within this group, it may be said that they repre-
sent a number of nonmainstream points of view and generally 
fall to the left of center within the political arena. The 
fundamental issue here, however, is the fact that their cri-
tique as it applies to schooling is political at all. 
If concerns of schooling may be defined politically, 
can they be treated politically? The answer is "Yes,· as 
even a cursory survey of America's legal history demon-
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strates with rich accounts of legislative and judicial pro-
ceedings concerning the operation of its public schools. In 
fact, during the last thirty-two years since Brown ~· Board 
Qj_ Education, 347 U. S. 483 C1954>, lawmakers have reconsti-
tuted the domain of educational policy. Decisions by local 
school boards (and in some cases by individual teachers) 
have come under court control. When educational praxis is 
defined in terms of a vested public interest in education, 
initiative concerning policy that was once vested in local 
school administration has shifted to state and federal enti-
ties, which in turn are mediated through the courts when 
conflicts arise.3 
It is contended here that the use of the court system 
to resolve conflict in education has had the ultimate effect 
of rendering much of the reconceptualists' theory moot in 
regard to the American system of education~ Moreover, 
there is little chance that American education could be 
redesigned to reflect a value base with an overriding inter-
est in "emancipation" Cin this sense, an interest in in-
suring that power is retained by the individual) that the 
reconceptualists seek. We are firmly locked into a system 
that rests upon a predominant interest in technical "con-
trol" Cin this sense, the investment of power in technically 
defined authority, regulations, and procedures), and that 
control ultimately resides in authority in the form of the 
American legal system. 
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By virtue of the fact that this nation is based upon a 
constitution, all its institutions, education included, are 
automatically locked into some form of technical control. 
The concern is not whether some form of control operates in 
American education; rather, it is the degree of that control 
and the extent to which it excludes other interests. There 
may have been an opportunity during what Tyack calls the 
symbolic phase of American education, or the early years of 
the bureaucratic phase, to take advantage of the flexibility 
left to local authority to minimize the intrusion of the 
state into the affairs of education.5 If we could have come 
to understand the state's interest in education as an inter-
est based in hermaneutics or critique, the contemporary re-
liance on control might not have been needed; however, the 
concept of control was not seen as problematic from the 
start, and we have reached a time in our history that to im-
plement the reconceptualists' theories in our current educa-
tional system would be the same as starting over. 
In example of a current case related to instructional 
media, a group of parents in Mobile, Alabama, have launched 
an assault through the courts on the treatment of religion 
in textbooks used in Alabama public schools. The arguments 
in the trial of Smith ~· Board of School Commissioners 21.. 
Mobile County did not turn on the philosophical concern:/' 
37 
but rather on the technical accuracy of a research report 
funded by the U. S. Department of Education through Secre-
tary of Education William J. Bennett,s discretionary funds.7 
How is it that fundamental educational issues of a philo-
sophical nature can be treated in a mechanical fashion? 
The reason for this can be found in the evolution of 
the involvement of the courts with education. Once it was 
established that disagreements concerning schooling could be 
resolved legally, the source of authority for educational 
decisions began to shift from the vagueness of local author-
ity to legislative bodies expressing laws and guidelines in 
precise terminology that reflect what is constitutionally 
permissible. As a result, schools have become inextricably 
linked with the language of the judicial system. Moreover, 
the widespread reliance on litigation suggests that the 
prospect of legal remedy has seeped into the national 
consciousness. The broad issues of education have come to 
be viewed by professionals and non-professionals alike in 
terms of agreement or disagreement with the official author-
ity. Past interests in informal concensus can now be ex-
pressed technically in the name of formalized due process 
proceedings and collective bargaining. By the same token, 
an interest in critique often translates into the tech-
nically described electoral process and lobbying procedures. 
Over the years, we have accepted as part of our common sense 
that the major concerns of education can, and should, be ex-
pressed and satisfied through appeal to official channels. 
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Since the turn of the century the cases decided by the 
courts have served to clarify the rights and obligations of 
all parties involved in education, while at the same time 
deepening the reliance on a technical control of what was 
once considered the domain of the autonomous teacher prac-
ticing the art of education. As recently as two decades 
ago, there was a possibility for accomodation of alternative 
value bases in the structure of education that could have 
institutionalized that autonomy. However, somewhere along 
the way, we reached and passed a •point of no return• that 
effectively sealed off any significant accommodation of any 
value orientation other than one of control. The following 
discussion illustrates this contention. 
One of the earliest schooling issues to face the courts 
Involved compulsory education In Pierce .¥..· Society 2.f. ~ 
~, 268 U.S. 510 (1925). The Society of Sisters was an 
Oregon-based corporation that challenged the Compulsory 
Education Act <Ore.Gen Laws, ch. 1, p. 9 (1923)) adopted 
November 7, 1922, by the voters of Oregon. The thrust of 
this Act was to require any parent or guardian having charge 
of a child between the ages of eight and sixteen to send the 
child to public school until the child's completion of the 
eighth grade. The Society of Sisters operated a series of 
privately funded orphanages and schools, including schools 
that normally served students between the ages of eight and 
sixteen. The curriculum of the schools operated by the 
Society of Sisters was essentially the same as that offered 
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in the public schools. With the establishment of these 
schools in 1880, the Society of Sisters had acquired real 
property necessary to their maintenance and operation. En-
forcement of the Act would destroy a significant portion of 
8 
their business and diminish the value of their property. 
It is interesting that given the zeitgeist of the 
1920's, the resolution of Pierce for the plaintiff turned 
not on religion or free speech but on potential loss of 
property. Clearly, the case involved broad tmplications, 
and there is a question as to whether the Court decided an 
9 
issue that was improperly presented. In a situation that 
involved moral and ethical issues, the Court chose to reach 
for a technical interest in the form of the destruction of a 
business for the languaging it needed to rely on the Const!-
tutlon to rectify a wrong. The plaintiff's argument was a 
strong one in that it defined an issue within the Due 
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Pierce had 
little to do with the nature of the schools themselves and 
did not tamper with value sets that guide instruction, but 
it demonstrated the strength of the due process argument 
when the technical interest was couched in terms of some-
thing as concrete as money. 
It is interesting to reflect upon the effectiveness of 
the plaintiff's arguments in Pierce, especially considering 
the fervor of anti-foreign sentiment at the time the case 
was decided. In contrast, note that however powerful the 
loss of income might be as a defense, it in no measure ap-
proxlmates the profound impact upon the nature of educa-
tional praxis when economics are used as a legal weapon. 
There are numerous cases involving money, contracts, and 
education in significant Court decisions, and one does not 
have to search too deeply in the literature to find ex-
amples. For this discussion, a trio of students' rights 
cases bring the •point of no return• into view. 
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In 1969, three students who attended public schools in 
Des Hoines, Iowa, planned to wear black armbands to school 
beginning December 16 and continue throughout the holiday 
season to publicly oppose the war in Vietnam. The princi-
pals of the Des Hoines schools learned of this plan and on 
December 14 adopted a new policy that students who wore arm-
bands to school would be asked to remove them. Failure to 
do so would result in suspension. On December 16, the stu-
dents wore the armbands and were suspended. Under sec. 1983 
of Title 42 of the United States Code the students asked for 
an injunction restraining the school district from discl-
10 pllnlng them, and also sought nominal damages. 
The Supreme Court decided Tinker ~· ~Moines 
Independent Community School Pistrict, 393 U.S. 503 (1969), 
in favor of the plaintiff agreeing that the administration 
was wrong in passing hasty regulations against the wearing 
of black armbands. It ls clear in the majority opinion and 
Black's dissent that there were sharply divided views on the 
balance that was being created between the authority of 
teachers and the freedoms of students. Of fundamental 
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significance in the majority opinion is the reasoning that 
rules cannot be made to prevent the discussion of issues. 
In the eyes of the Court, the wearing of armbands was an 
element of free speech and the expression of free speech in 
this instance was not disruptive, and therefore school of-
ficials could not respond in a totalitarian manner. The 
case was presented and decided on First Amendment princl-
pl es. 
In Justice Black's dissent, it is argued that the pro-
visions of the First and Fourteenth Amendment do not give 
total freedom of free expression to students. He believed 
that the armbands were disruptive and school officials were 
well within their rights to prohibit them. Black credited 
this case with the initiation of a new era in which the 
power to control pupils by school officials will be trans-
ferred to the Court by litigious students. 
Turned loose with lawsuits for damages and injunc-
tions against their teachers as they are here, it 
is nothing but wishful thinking to imagine that 
young, immature students will not soon believe it 
is their right to control the schools rather than 
the right of the States that collect the taxes to 
hire the teachers for the benefit of the pupils. 
It is important to note two things about Tinker: one, 
that students were recognized as citizens with defensible 
rights under the Constitution; and two, the legal issues, 
not the particulars of remedy, were central to the case. 
<In fact, the case was remanded to the lower courts for 
this.> Remedy itself assumed greater importance in cases 
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that followed. 
For example, six years after Tinker, the Court heard 
~ ~· Lopez, 419 U.S. 565 (1975>, another case involving 
the rights of students. Nine high school students attending 
the Columbus, Ohio, public school system were suspended from 
school for up to ten days. Such suspension was permitted by 
Ohio law, provided a student's parents were notified of the 
reason within twenty-four hours. If a student had been 
expelled, the decision could have been appealed to the Board 
of Education, but no similiar procedure was provided for 
student suspensions. The students filed action under Sec. 
1983 Title 42 of the United States Code to declare the Ohio 
law unconsti- tutional and in violation of the Due Process 
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. The Court decided in 
favor of the plaintiff. 
Within the facts of this case alone, the Court found 
evidence of direct violation of Lopez's due process rights 
in terms of property rights as it did in Board of Regents ~· 
B..Q!.b.. 11 More importantly, the Court went on to answer the 
question of •what process is due• if •due process• applies. 
In unmistakable terms, the Court created a suspension policy 
for the Columbus Public School System~ Not only was it 
clearly established that students have rights under the 
Constitution, with~ the Court was willing to provide the 
technical expertise in formulating the policies that delin-
iate those rights. 
Of interest is the dissenting opinion in the ~case 
43 
written by Justice Powell who opposed the reliance on the 
judiciary and the adversary process as a way of resolving 
what he considered a routine problem of education by stating 
In mandating due process procedures the Court mis-
apprehends the reality of the normal teacher-pupil 
relationship •.• No one can forsee the ultimate 
frontiers of the new tthicket, the Court now en-
ters. Today,s ruling appears to sweep within the 
protected interest in education a multitude of 
discretionary decisions in the educational pro-
cess. Teachers and other school authorities are 
required to make many decisions that may have 
serious consequences for the pupil ... If as 
seems apparent, the Court will now require due 
process procedures whenever such routine school 
decisions are challenged, the impact upon public 
education will be serious indeed. 
Lopez used 42 U.S.C. sec. 1983 to seek remedy according 
to the facts of a given case, and remedy was given in the 
form of the creation of school policy. Another case, Wood 
~· Strickland, 420 U. S. 308 (1975), decided in the same 
year as Goss, dramatically broadened the scope of 42 U.S.C. 
sec. 1983 in a way that forced school administrators to take 
student complaints far more seriously than they had in the 
past. Two students were suspended from Mena Public High 
School in Mena, Arkansas, for "spiking" punch served at a 
school party. At a later school board meeting which neither 
the students nor their parents attended, the two students 
were suspended for the remainder of the semester. The stu-
dents and their parents, with counsel, attended the next 
board meeting, but the suspension was affirmed. The stu-
dents sued the school board and won, arguing the suspension 
violated their rights of Due Process under the Fourteenth 
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Amendment and under Sec. 1983 of Title 42 U. S. Code 1983 
because: it provided a means to remedy; the school board 
acted under the •color of the law;• and the •person• men-
tioned in 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1983 is the same as a local gov-
erning body. ~established that as a citizen# a student 
is able to utilize 42 U.S.C. sec. 1983 to go beyond the case 
itself# as in~# in seeking a means to remedy a violation 
of constitutional rights. Acting under the color of state 
law# the school board members were found liable for real 
damages to the student injured. The essence of ~ is not 
the issue of denial of due process; rather it ls that a 
student can collect damages. For the first time# students 
were able to ·hit back• in a way that assaulted the private 
lives of those who direct education. 
If a digression may be permitted # an analogy can be 
drawn between the implications of Wood and the monoliths of 
Stanley Kubrlck#s film# ~: ~Space Odyssey# in which it 
is learned that at some point in the Earth#s forgotten past# 
this planet was visited by an intelligence from some space 
or dimension quite remote from this one. A series of black 
monoliths were placed in strategic locations to serve as 
sentinals to Man#s progress. Of particular significance was 
the one hidden on the dark side of the Hoon. Upon its dis-
covery# a signal was emitted to inform its creators that Han 
had achieved a certain level of technological sophistica-
tion. ~ ~· Strickland sounds a similar signal. 
Once an avenue into the private lives of educators via 
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economics has been created, potential consequences must be 
assessed by administrators about the exercise of their 
power. Just as it would be impossible for Man to retreat 
from the nuclear age, it is equally impossible to return to 
the state of affairs in education that existed before 
Pierce. Wood brings into consciousness an awareness that 
potentially any individual act by educators is subject to 
scrutiny against technically defined rules. The "educator/ 
artist" (that is, one who practices the art of education) 
must out of self-defense redefine the role to accommodate to 
a far greater extent than before the "educator/technician" 
aspect of the profession. Powell's dissent in Goss was 
correct in his recognition that the fact of rights for all 
disrupts the nature of the teacher-student relationship. 
Given another value case as Apple suggests would render such 
disputes meaningless; however, money lies at the heart of a 
capitalist society and without provisions to exempt an ele-
ment of society, such as education, from its rules, then it 
was inevitable that the monolith be discovered, that educa-
tion must be defined in terms of an overriding interest in 
control. 
It was suggested at the beginning of this chapter that 
reconceptualist notions regarding the redesign of American 
education are inconsequential against a background of legal 
proceedings, cut this ls NOT to imply that such work ls 
meaningless. To the contrary, the writings of Apple and 
others assume far greater importance once it is understood 
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that the issues of education must be viewed in terms of 
technical control and external authority. This can be il-
lustrated by a reappraisal of Sipuel ~· Board Q..f_ Regents of 
the University of Oklahoma, 332 U.S. 631 (1948>. 
Just a decade before Sipuel, as the first step in its 
assault on Plessy ~· Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896>, the 
N.A.A.C.P. successfully supported a black law school appli-
cant in Missouri ~· rel. Gaines~· Canada, 305 U.S. 337 
(1938) in which the court agreed that it was not enough for 
the state of Missouri to pay for Gaines's expenses to attend 
a law school with an open admission policy out of the state 
of Missouri. If the state of Missouri offered a law school 
to white students, then it must do the same for blacks ac-
cording to the "separate-but-equal" principle. 
With the establishment of the legal precedent of 
"separate-but-equal" for all forms of public education, the 
next step was the assault on the actual inequality of sepa-
rate instruction. Ada Sipuel was denied admission to the 
law school at the University of Oklahoma because of race. 
When the Supreme Court ruled that she must be admitted be-
cause there was no "separate-but-equal" law school facility, 
the state of Oklahoma attempted to create a separate school. 
It became clear that the notion that this new school was 
equal to the University of Oklahoma law school was not de-
fensible, and the legal action was dropped. During her 
first semester, Ms. Sipuel was segregated within the law 
school facilities, but other Court decisions successfully 
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removed those barriers, too. 12 
In her own words, Ms. Sipuel presents a stirring de-
fense of the American legal system.13 It can be said that 
brilliant, incisive legal minds turned to the particulars of 
her situation in order to render a fair judgment, and that 
the resolution of this suit affected her in a profoundly 
personal way. However, it must be noted at the same time 
that Ms. Sipuel did not formally initiate this case; in 
fact, it was not even her idea. Ada Sipuel was approached 
by others who recognized the inequities in education and 
were proceeding in a deliberate fashion within the legal 
system to seek change. By working in the name of what some 
humanist educators have called the "concrete individual," 
Cin the form of Ms. Sipuel> the N.A.A.C.P. sought to serve 
the "abstract individual" <any wrongfully disadvantaged 
black student>. 
In this sense, the N.A.A.C.P.'s course of action paral-
leled the logic of the defense in Pierce: in order to seek 
remedy to a broad issue, be it antiforeign or racial preju-
dice, it was necessary to first find a means of restating 
the real issue in concrete terms. In Pierce, the concrete 
issue became the destruction of a source of income. In 
Sipuel, the concrete issue was the denial of (equal> access 
to a source of income, with the difficult part being the re-
definition of what were once considered the intangibles of 
education, and presenting them as something just as ·con-
crete• as the loss of a business. Once the Court agreed 
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that the logic of "separate but equal" was flawed then rem-
edy was possible. 
The process of seeking remedy for an injustice involves 
two things: the recognition of the unjust situation, and a 
restating of that situation in terms that can be linked to 
constitutional principles. Ironically, what appears to be 
simplistic (the recognition of an injustice) may in fact be 
extraordinarily difficult. It is doubtful that Ada Sipuel 
on her own could have taken her case to the Supreme Court, 
expenses aside, simply because the schools and the wider 
culture with its ever-increasing reliance on technical con-
trol did not facilitate the sharpening of an individual,s 
critical skills beyond more than a vague awareness of a 
social ill that ought to be corrected. For Ada Sipuel, it 
took the insightful guidance of people like Thurgood 
Marshall to properly argue the case in specific terms to 
demonstrate how she, and therefore her peers, were being 
injured by a system of segregation. 
Ada Sipuel was victimized on two fronts: from the 
social institutions in which she lived, and the extent to 
which she had accepted these institutions into her own 
psychological make-up. In a Freudian interpretation, and in 
partial agreement with the Bowles and Gintis recognition of 
educational development as an outcome of class conflict, the 
individual is vulnerable to repression from social institu-
tions that act externally upon the individual and become 
part of the individual,s personal understanding of right and 
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wrong.14 An hlstorlcal avenue to correct repression ln 
society has been to redefine the system. Given the peculiar 
evolution of our system of education, that redefinition ls 
no longer possible, but it may not be necessary if the in-
dlvldual who recognizes a wrong can articulate a complaint 
in language that permits access to technically defined 
remedy. Therein lles the value of the reconceptuallsts. 
The reconceptuallsts may be read as theorists addres-
sing both the abstract and concrete lndlvldual. They speak 
of •resistances• and suggest alternative means by which edu-
cation can proceed through other value bases. Instead of 
attempting to create emancipatory systems of education, 
rather, educators can seek to create emancipated individuals 
who can then define the issues and seek correction within a 
system def lned in technical terms. It ls not necessary that 
all people become lawyers, but it is important that the 
skills of critique be developed as a safeguard against the 
manipulation of self by external forces. It is essential 
that individuals cultivate the ability to examine their own 
situations critically and articulate their own needs. 
The distinction between the concrete individual and the 
abstract individual is important to the study of education 
by a case approach. Each suit ls filed ln behalf of an indi-
vidual, or group of individuals, seeking to correct a very 
real affront to their personal and/or professional lives. 
By virtue of stare decisis, other cases are decided in simi-
lar manner or not developed at all. For instance, once Ada 
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Sipuel was admitted to the University of Oklahoma School of 
Law, it was obvious that similar cases would be decided in a 
similar manner and the litigation of this issue stopped. In 
this way, the abstract individual is served. It is possible 
for the Court to reverse itself, but the process is the 
same: the particulars concerning the individual work to 
define limits and capabilities for the broader society. 
The distinction is important in another sense, too. 
The individual teacher may do what the abstract teacher may 
not. The self-defense posture that created the Hteacher/ 
technician· mentioned earlier must not be allowed to com-
prise one's definition of one's role as an educator. If 
teachers as a group are subject to legal assaults that may 
have a direct effect on their personal lives, then they too 
will choose to influence the technical definitions of their 
roles to create some safeguards. It is left to the indivi-
dual teacher to critically examine his or her own situation 
and exercise resistances to a technologic mind set as he or 
she sees fit. Even if at the broader social level it is 
agreed that the battle for an approach to education other 
than one of a technologic mentality is lost, the autonomous 
individual may redefine the battle line at the site of one's 
own person and proceed accordingly. 
There is a futility in discussing educational theory in 
a social system that can no longer tolerate alternatives to 
the technical interests that direct the operation of public 
education. A case study approach illuminates past patterns 
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of discrimination and the avenues of rectification in terms 
of the system itself. If the reconceptualists are used to 
clarify the understanding of personal action, or to identify 
issues to be translated into the language of technical con-
trol, then their work is quite useful, especially in an ef-
fort to understand the impact of instructional media on in-
dividual development. If, however, their commentary is in-
troduced after a situation has been crystalized within the 
operating framework of legal procedure, then perhaps a cer-
tain indifference becomes the only rational response pos-
sible. 
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CHAPTER IV 
THEORETICAL FOUNDATIONS: PSYCHOANALYTIC 
ASPECTS 
If the application of instructional media in a specific 
instructional setting may be legitimated in terms of tech-
nical interests that satisfy social concerns, then consider-
ation may turn to the nature of interpersonal communication 
and the relevance of Freud's work. As a supplement to this 
chapter, a general review of Freud's theory of psychody-
namics is presented in the Appendix. 
An investigation of Freud's work vis-~-vis instruc-
tional media is not an easy task. A cursory review of the 
literature reveals an extraordinary wealth of publications 
relevant to psychoanalytic theory. The Index Q..f. Psycho-
analytical Writings lists over 100,000 such books and arti-
cles in more than thirty languages.1 Few, however, have 
focused exclusively upon the implications of Freud's work 
for education. 
This paper will take the position that Freud's psycho-
analytic theory does not imply a theory of instructional 
design on its own; rather, it serves a more useful function 
as a supplement to the theory that originates in educational 
research and other fields. Freud said he believed psycho-
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analysis was a legitimate source of influence for educa-
tional practice, but left the discovery of the nature of 
that influence to other researchers. Despite several mas-
terful attempts, however, this task is one that has remained 
unfulfilled. 
One reason for this can be attributed to the recurring 
shifts in the popularity of Freud,s ideas. As current 
theory in education changes, so then does the assessment of 
his impact on the field at a given time. This has been 
especially true given the anti-Freudian tendency of recent 
2 
years. For example, in the fourth edition of Theories Q..f. 
Learning, Hilgard and Bower (1975, p. 347) included a chap-
ter entitled •Freud,s Psychodynamics" which begins with the 
statement, "Sigmund Freud so influenced psychological 
thinking that a summary of theoretical viewpoints, even in 
the psychology of learning, is incomplete without reference 
to him." It is interesting that just six years later in the 
fifth edition of their text they omit any reference to Freud 
at all, except for a note in the preface explaining the de-
letion "because a survey of teachers using the text indi-
cated that those chapters were not being used in the typical 
course in learning theory <Bower and Hilgard, 1981, p. vi)." 
Another reason can be found not ln Freud's psychology, 
but in his sociology, which at times has assumed broad 
political overtones that obscured and confused the implica-
tions of his theory for education! Freudian theory lies 
outside the positivist logic involved in systems that call 
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for accountability in quantifiable terms, such as the Amerl-
can legal treatment of issues in schooling reviewed in 
Chapter III. While it may be concluded that Freud's ideas 
may be less useful than some contemporary theories for 
classroom practice, it would be an error to view his work 
solely in terms of the dynamics of individual personality. 
Freud's importance for education, the thrust of this chap-
ter, lies in the unique biological basis that he applies to 
his sociological understanding of Man. 
The confusion regarding the true nature and meaning of 
Freud's ideas has compounded the difficulties associated 
with research in psychoanalytic theory. Donald K. Adams 
C1954) commented that It is 
•.. quite apparent to anyone who reads the lit-
erature on psychotherapy that the level of dis-
course is low and that the different schools of 
psychotherapy have different systems of proposi-
tions. These systematic differences make inter-
communication with regard to single propositions 
extremely difficult and in so far as science in-
volves good intercommunication demonstrates the 
low level of scientific understanding in the do-
main Cp. 114> 
Communication regarding a single proposition can be 
facilitated according to the structure developed in Chapter 
II. First, it is necessary to state whether one is talking 
at the level of society, the individual, or both Cthat is, 
if the nature of argument requires a blurring of the dis-
tinction as in Marcuse's work>. Second, attempts to apply 
principles of psychotherapy to educational praxis are made 
easier by reviewing such efforts for the underlying inter-
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ests as Habermas stated. In this way, it ls possible to 
discover works that have a presumed interest in control, in 
intrepretation, or in emancipation. This makes the over-
whelming task of researching the literature much more man-
ageable, and it will be shown that part of the reason for 
the lack of acceptance of Freudian thought in instructional 
design has been this confusion among theorists as to the 
thrust of each other's ideas. 
Chapter III reviewed the issue of application of 
Freudian thought to instructional media at the level of 
society with a constitutive interest in emancipation. This 
chapter will now turn to the level of the individual. Be-
cause there is no history of psychoanalytic critique of 
instructional media, the foundations for such investigation 
will be taken from the emergent themes in a general review 
of the history of application of psychoanalysis to educa-
ti on. 
The application of psychoanalysis to education may be 
viewed in three broad phases from its beginning in the 
period prior to World War I to the present, as suggested by 
Rudolf Ekstein and Rocco L. Motto in a paper presented to 
the American Psychoanalytic Association entitled, "Psycho-
analysis and Education - Past and Future" which is summa-
4 
rized below. 
A first phase occurred in Europe that lasted until the 
beginning of the Second World War; a second phase in America 
and England started after the Second World War; and a third 
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<and current> phase that began in the early 1960's. 
The first phase itself may be divided into two parts. 
It should be noted that psychoanalysis was not well received 
initially so that there were relatively few attempts at ap-
plication to education prior to the First World War. Imme-
diately after the war, however, there was a desire for an 
abandonment of old approaches to education, so that a number 
of experimental applications of psychoanalysis to education 
were tried. There was a spirit of liberation that charac-
terized much of the work as a reaction to what had been 
regarded as the suppression of instinct in the Victorian 
society. At the same time, investigators such as Siegfried 
Bernfeld recognized the limits of education because of un-
conscious forces in the child as well as the reaction to 
these forces by society. 
With growing acceptance of the psychoanalytic movement 
came the first organized expression of an effort to relate 
psychoanalysis to education with the Zeitschift fur psycho-
analytische Padagogik in October, 1926. The lead article 
viewed psychoanalysis as a new means of education to be 
applied by teachers. This lack of differentiation between 
psychoanalysis and education has posed profound theoretical 
and practical dilemmas since that time. 
The main source of interest in the application of 
psychoanalysis came from teachers who became the first child 
analysts, such as Anna Freud. By the late 1930's, the 
psychoanalytically oriented educator shifted from emphasis 
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upon the liberation of the instincts to creation of the 
optimum environment for the avoidance of pathological trauma 
as well as the extremes of indulgence or strictness. In 
1936, techniques of psychoanalysis for educators were de-
scribed by Editha Sterba who recommended that teachers use 
interpretation to deal with a situational crisis in order to 
help a child cope with an educational task. 5 This approach 
focused upon specific observable disturbances as distin-
guished from routine educational situations where the educa-
tor functions as a teacher rather than as a therapist. In 
this way, Sterba expressed the view that the classroom 
teacher functions in two distinct roles, as psychoanalyst 
and instructor. 
The earliest attempts to apply Freud's psychoanalytic 
theory to the more routine educational situations of in-
struction yielded widely differing conclusions in three 
significant works that were published during the latter 
portion of the first phase.6 Between 1925 and 1930, three 
books on psychoanalytic education were published: August 
Aichhorn's Wayward Youth; Anna Freud's Psychoanalysis for 
Teachers and Parents; and Siegfried Bernfeld's Sisyphus Q.t. 
.lbg_ Limits 2i. Education. Each is significantly different 
from the others. Taken collectively, they represent the di-
versity of interpretations possible when attempting to in-
terpret Freud's work for practice. These will be reviewed, 
followed by the suggestion that the apparent contradictions 
among them, at least in part, stem from the differing inter-
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ests the researchers brought to their work, and the social 
level of their concern. 
Aichhorn's (1925) work is the text of a series of lee-
tures to which he added some additional material and pub-
lished as an orientation to the use of psychoanalysis with 
delinquent youth. He makes it clear from the beginning that 
his concern is for the control of the process of education. 
Psychoanalysis enables the worker to recognize 
dissocial manifestations as the result of an in-
terplay of psychic forces, to discover the uncon-
scious motives of such behaviour, and to find 
means of leading the disso- cial back to social 
conformity Cp. 3). 
Aichhorn also admits that the book is nothing more than 
an orientation to Freud's ideas coupled with some conjecture 
on its application to a specialized group. His intent, he 
claimed, was to Narouse thoughtful consideration ... and 
to stimulate independent effort (ibid.)." 
Aichhorn's understanding of Freud led him to conclude 
that deviant behavior is a result of some unresolved psychic 
conflict. In a general sense, he perceived his patients as 
individuals whose overt behavior represented the ongoing 
effects of this conflict. Treatment, then, must begin at 
the point of the conflict and take the form of •re-educa-
tion.· For instance, Aichhorn believed delinquent behavior 
could be the result of either an excess of love or an excess 
of severity. 7 Through transference, the teacher could try 
to create an environment that presents a balance between 
love and the established limits for overt behavior, thus 
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creating the external environment necessary for the reso-
lutlon of the conflict. 
This process is similiar to that of individual psycho-
therapy, but it is the ends that distinguish an educator 
from the therapist. The therapist seeks through trans-
ference to give the patient the means to work on emotional 
problems.8 The transference helps to create a temporary 
change as an avenue to later adjustments. In education, 
Aichhorn viewed transference as an end in itself. The 
transference achieved in the learning setting is an achieve-
ment in itself, representing a change in personality to per-
mit proper adjustment to society.9 
The ultimate weakness of Aichhorn's book lies in the 
vagueness of his observations. He was clearly enthusiastic 
about Freud's work because it provided a framework for what 
he claimed the •good teacher• knows intuitively, but the 
reader is never really made aware of what this intuition is, 
10 or how the less gifted teacher can acquire it. For in-
stance, Aichhorn (ibid. p. 149> noted that •from the very 
beginning we felt intuitively that above all we must see 
that the boys and girls from fourteen to eighteen had a good 
time." Such comments tend to diminish the credibility of 
his thought. 
It is interesting to note that Freud himself wrote an 
introduction to Aichhorn's book in which he made two points. 
One was that an educator, especially one lacking the in-
tuitive talents that Aichhorn possessed, should be trained 
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in psychoanalysis to better understand the dynamics of con-
flict experienced by the child. The other was a caution 
that education must not be confused with psychotherapy. He 
said that the appropriate role of psychoanalysis was to sup-
plement the practice of education instead of substitute for 
it. His concern for the role of psychotherapy in applica-
tion to education was that it • . guide the child on his 
way to maturity, to encourage him, and to protect him from 
taking the wrong path (ibid., pp. v-vi).• This represents a 
different interest than Aichhorn's, and is more closely 
aligned with that of his daughter, Anna. 
Anna Freud's early ideas about education and psycho-
therapy are offered in a collection of four lectures she 
presented to German day-school workers in 1929 and represent 
a strikingly different view of Sigmund Freud's work when 
compared to Aichhorn's text. Rather than assess means and 
methods for altering behavior, she developed an Introduction 
to psychotherapy that focused more on the explanation of be-
havior. 
For instance, in her last lecture entitled ·The Rela-
tion Between Psychoanalysis and Pedagogy,• she suggested 
three principles of psychoanalytic theory which can be of 
use to the educator.11 Review of these principles, or 
•characteristic viewpoints• as she called them, illustrate 
the hermeneutic nature of her work. 
The first was concerned with the three distinct stages 
of life through which the individual progresses leading to 
63 
adulthood. She stated that behavior can be understood only 
against the background of the child's given stage of life. 
In each period there ls a different emotional re-
action of the child to those around him, and a 
different stage of instinctual development, each 
of which is normal and characteristic. A special 
attribute of the child, or his method of reaction, 
cannot therefore be judged without reference to 
the specific period of his life <Anna Freud, 
p. 93). 
The second had to do with the inner growth of the 
child's personality. Instead of viewing the child as a 
homogenous being, he can be seen as representing a three-
part nature made of the id, ego, and superego. Inconsis-
tencies in behavior, then, may be traced to whatever part of 
the individual predominates at a given moment. This also 
points to the importance of the educator's becoming familiar 
with the students' backgrounds. 
The third principle is concerned with the conflict 
between the three divisions of the personality (a point that 
will assume far greater proportions later in phase two of 
the appliclation of Freudian thought to education). Regard-
less of the overt behavior of the child, it is important for 
educators to realize that the child is experiencing an on-
going inner struggle among these parts. How these ongoing 
conflicts are resolved depends upon the relative strength of 
each part of the personality to the others. This last point 
ls much the same conclusion that Alchhorn drew, but with 
different implications. For Anna Freud, the usefulness in 
recognizing the nature of internal conflict could be found 
64 
not in its potential as a means for correcting behavior, but 
for understanding what the teacher observed. 
Anna Freud admits that knowing this does little in 
providing practical guidance for the educator, but she does 
note that one conclusion may be that education should be 
limited whenever possible. The educator who presumes to 
interfere in the child's own method of conflict resolution 
Cthat is, insisting on replacing a •naughty" behavior with a 
•good• one> may be making permanent adjustments in the 
child's way of coping. Given the educator's ignorance of 
the child's inner life, she suggests that perhaps the educa-
tor is better in some instances to let the child develop on 
his own rather than conform to some external source of 
authority. This is not to suggest that education adopt a 
•hands off• policy. To the contrary, she admonishes the 
educator to seek the "via media,• or the middle road, be-
tween instinctual-gratification and instinctual-restric-
tion.12 
It is apparent that Anna Freud approached her assess-
ment of the role of psychoanalysis in education with caution 
and viewed it as a field in its infancy, immediately useful 
as a tool of explanation. Moreover, she explicitly admitted 
that psychoanalysis as a field of study was far from 
expressing a description of an analytical pedagogy. What ls 
most interesting about her work, though, is that out of her 
hermaneutlc position she anticipated each of Habermas's cat-
egories and identified three possible uses of psychoanalysis 
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for education. The first was that it is well qualified to 
offer a criticism of existing educational methods. Second, 
it offers an extension of the teacher,s knowledge about the 
complicated relations between the child and educator. 
Finally, as a method of treatment, it offers a means of 
repair of injuries which are inflicted upon children during 
the process of education. Thus, critique, interpretation, 
and control are each seen as potential uses for psycho-
analytic theory in education. 13 
Perhaps of greater interest, though, is that nearly 
fifty years later, in a preface to a new translation of the 
third text of interest here, Siegfried Bernfeld,s, Sisyphus 
Q.t.~ Limits 2.f. Education, Anna Freud <1973> reveals a 
continued predominant interest in hermaneutics. She states 
that new learnings, on which better education might be based 
.•. brings us closer to realizing the pos-
sibilities and impossibilities of changing the 
instinctual nature of the child and of assessing 
the benefits as well as the possible damage done 
to it by educational interference <Anna Freud, 
p. viii>. 
She concluded her foreword to Bernfeld,s book with 
another insightful observation that advances in education 
.•. will be all the more beneficial if we ap-
proach them and make use of them in the same 
spirit of criticism and skepticism which pervades 
the present book and gives it its especial value 
(ibid.). 
Bernfeld <1973) demonstrates his interest in critique 
in an attack on the existing theories of his time. 
The subject of its investigation is the product of 
its own foreshortened vision. It mistakes the 
psychic surface of the child for the whole child. 
Simply because the school separates learning from 
life and reduces vital beings to mere learners who 
are either bright or dull, the theory of instruc-
tion fancies that its findings about school 
learning represent true insights into learning 
generally and even into the life of the child. It 
assumes that the young mind is neatly organized 
into distinct faculties for reading, writing, 
arithmetic, manual arts, and religion; it then 
proceeds to investigate each and proclaims such 
rules as it is able to establish as psychological 
laws. It is blind to the integrity of the child 1 s 
life, to his drives, desires, and ideals, and 
knows nothing of the pleasure or the hatred he 
feels for formal learning. I am not saying that 
it is useless to observe children under the tan-
gled conditions of the school. Such experiments 
may prove instructive, though they would cer-
tainly be remote from life. One must know, how-
ever, what one is doing. But the methodologists 
of instruction, here as elsewhere, do not know. 
And that may the Lord forgive them, for I cannot 
(pp. 17-18). 
Bernfeld read Freud with a concern for exposing the 
subjective nature of prevailing standards and conventions. 
He saw education in his day as a mixture of capitalistic 
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interests and parental anxieties passed from one generation 
to the next as a social tradition that was never questioned. 
He argued that education was at all times conservative be-
cause it prepares the individual to become like other mem-
bers of the society, thus maintaining the status quo. It 
was the duty of educators, he argued, to recognize the 
inherent inequities in the educational system and to 
eliminate them if possible. Bernfeld also observed that 
educators are themselves products of their society and 
ultimately unable to rid themselves of all the limitations 
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which society puts on them. In this sense, the limits of 
education are not only in a given political system, but in 
the psychology of the child, the adult, and finally in the 
teacher. 
In this way, Bernfeld incorporated the sociological 
nature of Freud's work into his assessment that education 
was limited ultimately by forces over which it could exert 
no absolute control: the unconscious forces in the child, 
and the reaction of society to those forces. Bernfeld 
endorsed the scientific investigation of childhood develop-
ment as an attempt to break with the prevailing approach 
that ignored these limits and presumed without any theoret-
ical basis or formalized statement that the role of educa-
tion was to make the child a •good• child above all else. 
He argued that psychoanalysis offered a starting point and a 
frame within which to work, beginning with the psychoanal-
ysis of the teacher himself. In this way, the educator 
would be able to 
••• scientifically understand the working of 
mind and body without being swayed like weather-
vanes by political, and other, ideologies and the 
prejudices of society. Or rather, one should say 
that educators should at least be aware of their 
own frailities and the societal influences under 
which they work and be able not to be entirely 
swayed by them <Bauxbaum, 1969, p. 30). 
If the books mentioned briefly above are a representa-
tive sample of the thought of those psychoanalytic educators 
contemporary with Freud, it may be concluded that despite 
distinct differences in tone and conclusions, there was at 
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least one theme that eaerged as common among them, that of 
the role of conflict as impetus for educational interven-
tion.14 For instance, while Alchorn cautioned fro• the 
start that his observations were rooted in his own (unspeci-
fied) intuition, he was firm in his assertion that education 
must proceed from the observable evidence of the conflict 
hls students experienced as individuals. Anna Freud was 
more explicit in her explanation of the development of the 
individual in her assessment, but concluded as Aichhorn did 
that the child should be seen as one who enters the educa-
tlonal setting a product of quite profound experiences and 
unresolved conflicts. She stressed that knowledge of these 
conflicts helps the teacher to know when to discipline and 
when to reward, and ultimately, how to teach although in her 
opinion an articulated pedagogy was never achieved. Bern-
feld proceeded from a more sociological point of view by 
observing that the individual is in conflict not only with 
himself and his parents, but with society as well, but he 
agreed with Anna Freud and Aichorn that the teacher should 
undergo psychoanalysis personally. He addressed the 
specific concern of what implications psychoanalysis might 
have for learning theory by concluding that the issue was 
best left to future researchers who would have the benefit 
of a more mature science of child development. 
Though there were the beginnings of application of 
psychoanalytic understanding to the routine classrooa 
situation by child analysts in Vienna ln the 1930's, the 
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European analytic organizations began to crumble by the end 
of the decade. These were replaced by new organizations in 
the United States and Europe which were influenced by the 
political upheavals in Europe and the Second World War to 
the extent that educational institutions were viewed in 
light of the existing social order and emancipatory inter-
ests. Against these aore clearly defined interests occurred 
a rereading of some earlier phase one works that had not 
achieved the initial attention that Aichhorn, Anna Freud, or 
Bernfeld had. 
For instance, new significance was given to the 1931 
publication of ~Early Years 2..f. ~, by Al ice Bal int, in 
which it was observed that there are no absolutes in peda-
gogy or mental hygiene, and that society, regardless of its 
nature, produces its underpinnings in educational measures. 
Conversely, educational reforms necessarily led to changes 
in civilization even if such change were not intentional, 
15 thus making the science of education revolutionary. 
Balint's work in some respects anticipated the rela-
tionship between psychoanalysis and education as it e•erged 
during the second phase with far less emphasis on technique 
than on study and research. With the appearance of ~ 
Psychoanalytic Study sll.. 1.bJ:.. Child, there can be seen a clear 
shift away froM a preoccupation with psychoanalysis as 
clinical practice to a more theoretical investigation for 
general theaes of social interest. The 1950 publication of 
Erik H. Erikson's classic Childhood ans1 Society ls an excel-
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lent example of such scholarship. 
Erikson described his text as a psychoanalytic book on 
the relation of the ego to society in which he investigates 
a variety of cultural settings and the meaning of childhood 
within them. 16 He observes that in all cultures children 
are prepared for an entrance into adult life by some sort of 
schooling, whether that be in classroom, field, or jungle. 17 
The child receives, in Erikson's words, some •systematic in-
struction· in which the •fundamentals of technology• are de-
veloped, whether it be hand tools and weapons, or the more 
sophisticated developments of literate cultures. 18 Through-
out this stage of development is a potential for ego damage 
in the sense of inadequacy and inferiority for the child who 
feels unable to cope with these new social demands. This 
potential is exacerbated in the more complex cultures with a 
high degree of role specialization. School life becomes 
quite distinct from the parents, and to the extent that a 
child experiences a blurring of his understanding of his 
proper role he experiences anxiety for his own survival. 
We are also aware of the fact that the inhumanity 
of colossal machine organization endangers these 
very gains of what is so specifically American. 
Responsible Americans know the danger emanating 
from a ~total war' machine and from its facsimile 
in peacetime. But it is not superorganization 
alone which today makes cultural values relative. 
The rapid spread of communication and the in-
creasing knowledge of cultural relativity endanger 
people who are in a marginal position, people who 
are traumatically exposed to a numerical increase 
or the closer proximity or the greater power of 
others-than-themselves. Among such people the 
drive for tolerance has its point of diminishing 
returns: it causes anxiety <Erikson, 1985, p. 17). 
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Two questions emerge here that have significant impli-
cations for the field of instructional media if Erikson's 
observations are taken to be correct. For one, the poten-
tial for harm to children as a result of the process of pub-
1 ic education may be greater for those children in techni-
cally advanced cultures. Child training in other cultures 
<such as the two American Indian tribes he profiles> which 
is characterized by a rich personal contact between teacher 
and student appears to diminish the potential for anxiety in 
adult life. One question, then, asks if the use of instruc-
tional media contributes to this potential. Upon 
reflection, a second question comes from the first: If 
it is accapted that the experience of instructional media 
can be shown as a contributor to this anxiety, can anything 
be done about it? 
A logical starting point in investigation of these 
questions is evident from one of the predominant themes of 
phase one research in its assessment of conflict. As sug-
gested earlier, it appears that the early psychoanalytic 
educators understood the experience of conflict at the site 
of the ego as an avenue into the individual for purposes of 
public education. If the nature of conflict were under-
stood, then it may be the case that specific implications 
for the use of instructional media may be revealed. 
In this sense, it is unfortunate that phase two took 
its pronounced theoretical turn away from the earlier inter-
est in specific classroom practice of Aichhorn for it may 
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have led to clearer assessments of a child's internal exper-
ience of the process of education. On the other hand, there 
was a vein of theoretical research ln phase two that drew 
its observations from special cases of deviant children in 
an attempt to better understand how individuals experience 
the broader forces of society. Of particular interest here 
ls the work of Gerald Pearson's 1954 publication of Psycho-
analysis e.rui :th.st Education of .:t,llit Child. 
In attempting to derive specific implications for in-
structional media from Pearson's work vis-~-vis the Freudian 
concept of conflict, it is useful to recall that Freud was 
19 trained as a reductionist and a positivist. His early 
work as a scientist and his fascination with the German ad-
vances in physics in the study of energy transfer influenced 
his construction of an energy-flow model of mental energy. 
His desire for mechanistic explanations of mental func-
tioning was tempered by his recognition of the need to ac-
cornmodate the more elusive influence of human purpose, 
intention and conflict. The result was the formulation of a 
theory that was useful for its metaphoric representations of 
the processes that Freud believed would be given positivis-
tic explanations in the future. It is logical, then, to 
turn to a construct to explore the specific role of conflict 
in learning. 
Because the ego is the regulator between the internal 
and the external world, it ls the site of all learning. It 
is also the site for the mediation of all conflict. Freud 
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argued that it ls the tendency of an individual to reduce 
conflict; the intensity of this tendency ls a measure of the 
individual's motivation. The extent that the ego ls con-
flict free is a measure of the individual's learning capac-
ity. Pearson identifies four steps in learning from the 
psychoanalytic point of view: 
1. The projection of instinctual libidinal impulses 
onto the subject matter to be learned. <This gives 
the subject matter interest and the learner is 
aroused to make the subject matter part of himself. 
It ls important to note that the major concern is 
the opportunity to release instinctual energy. The 
efforts on the part of a teacher to present the 
subject matter in a desirable way assumes secondary 
importance.) 
2. The agreement of the ego with the projected libid-
inal impulses (otherwise it would act to block 
discharge). 
3. The introjection of the matter to be learned along 
with the projected instinctual impulses Cthus be-
coming part of the psychic reality of the indivi-
dual). 
4. Secondary differentiation of the projected instinc-
tual impulses from the matter that has been learned 
Cso that it becomes an acquisition and is differen-
tiated from the impulses themselves which may have 
components which are frightening to the ego>. 
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Conflict becoaes significant for learning in the role 
It plays as a facilitator or <more coamonly) as a direct or 
indirect inhibitor. Generally, the source of the conflict 
can be traced to one of four sources: the id; the superego; 
a disorder in the ego in the fora of a malfunction; or to a 
source external to the individual. The analysis of conflict 
in learning ls complicated by the fact that it can arise 
from any source, in any combination, and in any intensity of 
effect within the limits of the individual. Moreover, it 
can occur at any point of the learning process as outlined 
above. 
Pearson admits that the delicate balance of forces 
involved in the learning process makes it difficult to 
design technical methods of investigation. For this reason 
he explored the role of conflict through the clinical exam-
ination of learning disorders. His work suggests three 
broad categories of analysis of the impact of Freudian con-
flict on learning: 
1. Physiological attributes resulting in conflicts 
that affect learning; 
2. Psychological conflicts that affect the learning 
process indirectly; 
3. Psychological conflicts that participate in the 
learning process. 
The learning process begins with the functioning of the 
central nervous system; therefore the ability to learn has a 
structural basis. This structural endowment, a result of 
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genetic and envlronaental factors, ls a speclallzed part of 
the ego called the nonconfllctual ego. Unlike the other 
parts of the ego, the nonconfllctual ego ls not foraed as a 
result of conflict; however, the physiological attributes of 
the individual can function through the nonconflictual ego 
to act in conjunction with other sources of conflict to in-
directly affect the learning process. Typically, conflict 
involving the nonconflictual ego affects learning prior to 
the initiation of the four-step process as outlined above. 
An example of the role of conflict resulting fro• 
physiological sources might be the individual who is born 
with a diminished intellectual endowment <expressed through 
the nonconflictual ego> because of disease or injury, or as 
a result of genetic factors. The slow development of the 
child creates prolonged periods of infantile anxieties and a 
decreased ability to identify with the parents <which could 
also affect the quality of love exhibited by the parents>. 
This child comes into learning situations with a weakened 
ego. The conflict between the superego or external demands 
and the ego disorder ls experienced as frustration cy virtue 
of a diminished ability to cope. 
Other physiological conditions can result in noncon-
fl ictual ego disorders. Chronic illness, physical defects 
<especially iapaired vision or hearing>, or lmpairaent of 
aotor functions can all contribute to ego disorders in a 
aanner siailar to those discussed above. Physical fatigue, 
notably exertion that leads to decreased oxygen flow, can 
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lessen the functlonlng of the ego in conflict situations. 
Note, too, that anxiety can result in physical responses 
that can lead to fatigue. Ongoing tension can weaken the 
body through constant muscle contractions so as to lessen 
the capacity of the nonconflictual ego to contribute to the 
resolution of conflict situations. 
It ls interesting that the demands placed on the ego 
can lead to a conflict that interferes with learning if the 
subject ls endowed with superior intellectual capacity. For 
instance, in a classroom situation this individual may re-
quire only a few minutes to complete a learning task de-
signed to occupy a much longer time period. With the task 
completed, and nothing else to occupy hls time, the indivi-
dual may resort to daydreaming and discover that this activ-
ity ls more pleasurable than the one encountered in the real 
world. If this occurs on repeated occasions, the indi-
vidual ultimately falls behind and later experiences the 
learning task without the requisite skills to complete it 
successfully. As in the example above, the conflict ls 
between demands and weakened capacity in the ego. If the 
conflict ls resolved by escaping into more intense day-
dreaming then the conflict be~omes a hindrance to future 
learning. 
The functioning of conflict in learning ls less obvious 
when we turn to its purely psychological sources. The 
second category involves those conflicts that affect the 
capacity to learn because of conscious conflicts ln the ego. 
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These conflicts do not take part directly ln the learning 
process, but act indirectly by influencing the subject's at-
tention relative to a speclf ic learning task. 
One example of this can be seen in the operant condl-
t ion ing of a subject. If an individual ls punished for a 
particular response to a learning task, a conflict arises at 
the first or second step of the learning process. The ego 
blocks the cathexis with an anti-cathexis, thus creating a 
conflict with the superego or an external force, and learn-
ing is disrupted. 
In operant conditioning, it can be argued that conflict 
can facilitate learning in some instances. For instance, a 
rewarded response in an ongoing learning situation can be 
vested with libidinal energy despite opposite urgings from 
the superego. The creation of a conflict Can •anti-Manti-
cathexis) in response to the superego's anti-cathexis can 
favor the id and permit the smooth progression of the four 
steps in the learning process. 
A second example of conflict functioning indirectly in 
the learning process would concern the subject's involvement 
with another subject. For instance, if a classroom teacher 
is viewed with hate, anger, or fear, <perhaps as a result of 
a real experience, displaced feelings, transference, projec-
tion, or through a failure to make an appropriate identifi-
cation> a conflict is created by the ego clocking the in-
vestment of libidinal energy. 
The first two examples have identified explicit ex-
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ternal sources that force attention to theaselves, thereby 
creating a conflict affecting learning. The deflection of 
attention aay also originate in the subject who actively 
chooses to focus on some other concern or object. This ls 
often experienced as anxiety. For instance, a child at 
school who, for whatever reason, fears for the mother's 
safety will focus attention on the resolution of this per-
ceived threat to the child's personal security, to the ex-
clusion of any learning task. Slallarly, an lndlvldual 
experiencing shame, guilt, embarrassment, or any other 
threat to personal safety will tend to work on that problea. 
Instinctual desires, especially sexual urges in adolescents, 
coae into direct conflict with superego and external demands 
from parents and teachers. At best, total attention cannot 
be given to a learning task without the employment of some 
defense mechanism <such as a reaction formation> because as 
Freud observed the Instincts ultimately have the top 
priorlty. 20 
Pearson observes that educators typically assume that 
all forms of conflict in the learning process are included 
in the two broad categories discussed above. He describes a 
third category, however, in which the neurotic conflict ls 
actually a part of the learning process. This can occur at 
the third step, the fourth step, or following the fourth 
step of the model. 
Perhaps the most coaaon occurrence of conflict as a 
part of the learning process occurs after the fourth step as 
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an inhibition of the use of learning. The ego may refuse to 
act or respond to its recent learning because of a projected 
outcome resulting from the integration of the learning with 
the neurotic conflict. Pearson identifies three main 
reasons: 
1. In order not to undertake a fresh effort of repres-
sion which would mean a further conflict with the 
id. 
2. In order not to become involved in conflicts with 
the superego. 
3. Because it is so impoverished with respect to the 
energy available to it that it is driven to re-
strict its expenditure in many places at the same 
time. 
The capacity for the reception of information can be 
increased or decreased depending upon the instinctual con-
flicts present in the individual. This is closely tied to 
the individual's •curiosity,• or the exploration of pleasur-
able experiences in infancy. If this curiosity is severely 
punished or enthusiastically encouraged during infancy, the 
normal discharge of libidinal energy can be affected in 
later life. A learning activity that is involved with the 
function of sense organs, or in a secondary manner in 
thought, which relates in some way to an earlier punished 
activity may result in the unconscious inhibition of those 
sense organs and secondary thoughts throughout the learning 
experience. If, on the other hand, a learning activity 
activates a memory trace of pleasurable activity, then 
additional concentration may be focused on that event and 
other concerns blocked. 
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Finally, conflict can exert its influence on the 
learning process at point four through a disturbance in the 
assimilation and categorization of learning. In a mild 
form, this may account for the differences among individuals 
in the practice time required to master a task. If infor-
mation ls taken into the ego in the presence of an unre-
solved conflict, then the efficiency of the sorting process 
is hampered. The flexiblity in approaching the problem from 
new angles is weakened and apparently more time-on-task is 
required. 
This type of conflict can also represent one of the 
most serious types of learning difficulties because of the 
complexity of forces that can contribute to the conflict. 
Pearson offers one hypothesis that some new information 
arrives in the ego at essentially the same strength as an 
ongoing unresolved conflict in the forefront of the 
consciousness. The overwhelming influx of information 
results in a resolution of the conflict by regression to a 
point at which the secondary process of the ego no longer 
predominates. The primary process originates in the id, and 
represents no ability to catalogue, associate, or process 
logically. Cases such as this represent severe neuroses. 
The ultimate weakness of psychoanalytic descriptions is 
that in an academic world that developed with such strong 
biases for scientific methodology, Pearson's ideas have 
little substance of a technical nature. It must be remem-
bered, however, that the intent here ls to begin an ex-
ploration of alternative ways of viewing the role of 
instructional media and that such exploration may appear 
tentative. Specific conclusions regarding Pearson's work 
will be presented in Chapter V. 
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It might be noted, too, that despite Ekstein and 
Motto's prediction of the development of a third phase of 
application of psychoanalysis to education, it has failed to 
materialize. Certainly much more has been published regard-
ing this topic, such as Seymour Fox's Freud e.rui Education in 
1975, but it is the position here that little new insight 
into the application of Freudian theory to educational 
praxis has been offered. There has been a resurgence of 
interest in Europe and especially in France for a rereading 
of Freud from a sociological perspective initiated by 
Jacques Lacan and continued by Louis Althusser and Roland 
Barthes. A central point of agreement among them is for the 
critical significance of Freud's work and out of this may 
emerge new directions for educational research, but as yet 
such directions have not been expressed. 
At this point, then, discussion will turn to some con-
clusions regarding the implications of a psychoanalytic per-
spective for instructional media. Emphasis will be given to 
Pearson's ideas as they apply to practice in this field. 
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The essence of psychoanalysis stems from theories which 
developed in the interaction between patient and therapist 
according to what Freud first called the •talking cure."1 
This evolved into the highly specialized technique of 
psychoanalysis, but it remains at heart a two-way communi-
cation process for learning that functions in much the same 
way as public education does. It is by interaction with 
significant other individuals that we gain many of the in-
sights necessary for coping with the demands and stresses of 
life. In a school setting, the student solves the problems 
encountered in the classroom through interactions which 
often involve the teacher or peers, as Erickson and others 
have observed. Ernest Jones (1923, p. 665) offered a simple 
definition of education in psychoanalytic terms by saying 
that a •. child can, of course, educate himself, but by 
education is usually meant the influencing of a child by 
another person for certain specific purposes.· 
This ls not to imply that broader sociological under-
standings are of no value. In fact, just the opposite is 
true, because it is the sociological character of Freud's 
work that led to the examination of the interests that 
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direct the design of most instructlonal medla, as dlscussed 
in Chapter III. Clearly, we may debate instructional media 
in terms of emancipation at the level of soclety <in terms 
of our phylogenesls> but the unique combination of our 
American legal system coupled with the fact that media may 
be defined as a physical object <as opposed to a process or 
technique> liable to examination and debate outside the 
school setting has rendered much of this argumentation moot. 
The legal checks upon school activity prevent definition of 
the highly visible instructional media product in terms 
other than those that serve a dominant positivist interest. 
The content of instructional media ls therefore rooted 
in the analytic-empirical sciences. It is the delivery of 
the information contained within this technically designed 
media that assumes significance for emancipatory interests. 
Delivery occurs in the more personalized and flexible 
setting of the classroom and may be used in ways that serve 
2 each of the categories of interest as defined by Habermas. 
For this reason alone, a critical investigation of the 
function of the use of instructional media must occur at the 
site of an individual student who is understood in terms of 
both psychological and social development. 
The concern here is for what happens when the funda-
mental nature of education as an on-going process of inter-
act ion between two people ls interrupted however briefly by 
the use of instructional media. If it ls possible that 
anxieties are created for students by virtue of the exper-
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lence of a one-way coaaunlcatlon as Pearson's work laplles, 
<that ls, if students are inadvertently being denied an 
avenue of problea-solvlng because of a technical aeans of 
instruction> then it ls valid to explore that experience to 
see If any change In our approach to pedagogy ls warranted. 
It ls unfortunate that such concerns are not often ad-
dressed. One popular understanding of the purpose of public 
education ls found within the framework of the functional 
paradig• of education. 3 For aost citizens, school repre-
sents a process for selecting and promoting people according 
to their talents, and for socializing all people Into the 
culture. It would be ironic if, in our zeal for academic 
excellence, we have Inadvertently manipulated the advances 
of technology into uses that insure specific cognitive 
growth in soae areas of a person's life at the expense of 
heightened anxieties. While it ls not the intent of this 
paper to suggest that this ls the case, It ls a conclusion 
that further Investigation ls warranted concerning whether 
the unlnforaed use of instructional media for teaching pur-
poses may create restrictions on personal development. 
To some extent, the literature within the field of 
instructional media has demonstrated attempts to understand 
the student's personal experience of Media. It ls generally 
accepted that the initial state of the learner at the begln-
4 nlng of any learning situation ls Important. It appears, 
however, that no psychologically valid prescriptive instruc-
tional aethods for Instructional Media have been forMulated 
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outside a aechanistlc assessment. There has been a failure 
to analyze meaningfully the iapact of instructional aedla 
communications on the internal psychological processing 
operations of individual learners, and a cursory review of 
the literature suggests that this ls not an area of inten-
sive research at this time. 5 If this is true of the cur-
rently popular cognitive psychology then lt might be assumed 
that <owing to its present disfavor> proportionally less 
research about Freudian conflict and its relationship to 
instructional media is in progress.6 
It must be remeabered that Freud's work does not iaply 
a unified theory of learning; rather, as he observed, it may 
be used as a supplement to other theory more closely assocl-
ated with pedagogy. Freud was a positivist who reluctantly 
turned away from the prevailing aechanistic models of his 
7 time to construct his own theory of personality. He never 
disavowed his conviction that ultimately the actual process 
of human functioning could be described in physical terms, 
but he left that task to others in the f leld of education.8 
Of importance for the investigation begun here is the 
idea that an individual ls born with certain capablities and 
instincts, but it is out of conflict that the personality 
takes shape. The formation of the ego, followed by the 
superego, plus an extensive array of defenses develop 
relatively slowly as the Individual prepares to encounter 
the external world on his own terms. By the age of five, 
the lndlvldual has experienced profound conflicts. Ironl-
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cally, soae of the most slgnlf lcant events In the Indivi-
dual's life are experienced as conflicts so terrifying that 
their aeaories are repressed deep within the subconscious. 
While the memories of those earliest times may be lost, the 
influences of the conflicts surrounding the• continue to in-
fluence the individual throughout his llfe.9 
If indeed the individual developed out of a process of 
conflict, and that process ls never completely resolved, 
then the teacher must take into account before anything else 
that the ego ls never truly conflict-free. 10 Virtually all 
learning objectives attained by the student in the contem-
porary classroom will be colored by the extent and nature of 
soae conflict(s) at any given aoaent by that Individual. It 
would be convenient if conflict functioned as an electrical 
switch, either •on• or •off;• either of extreme intensity to 
completely stop learning, or totally resolved to permit un-
inhibited understanding. Unfortunately, such ls not the 
case, and the teacher must design instruction to cope with 
the unknowable nature of the learner's inner life. 
Freud and his followers suggested that a first step in 
this effort must be with the teacher as an individual. If 
the classroom ls serving as a foru~ in which the Instructor 
ls attempting subconsciously to work out personal unresolved 
conflicts, that person May Inadvertently be adding to the 
conflict experienced by the student. How these conflicts 
are resolved is certainly a matter of individual consider-
ation but by whatever aeans the instructor must be able to 
dlalnlsh the effect of personal conflicts ln the classrooa 
in order for efficient instruction to occur. 11 
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Following self-analysis, the teacher can turn to other 
areas for review ln search of ways in which teaching alght 
create conflict or Inhibit conflict resolution. This does 
not necessarily involve the individual psychoanalysis of 
each student. Given a theoretical understanding of the con-
flict each human experiences in his progress toward stabili-
zation, certain generalizations aay be ~ade about the 
existing instructional setting, the materials used ln in-
struction, and the nature of the relationships the student 
experiences ln this setting. 
It is recognized that any observations offered are 
tentative, and serve best as starting points for future re-
search. There are aany issues that can be raised and many 
avenues for research suggested; but in following the theme 
of conflict Investigation that emerged fro• the phase one 
writers coupled with the logic developed by Pearson, broad 
categories for investigation May be identified in three 
questions: 
l. Does instructional media participate in physio-
logical conflicts that affect learning? 
2. Does instructional media participate in psycho-
logical conflicts that affect the learning process 
indirectly? 
3. Does instructional media participate in psycho-
logical conflicts that affect the learning process 
directly? 
These categories are not necessarily discrete, and some 
overlap ls unavoidable. Each question will be examined 
briefly with suggestions for possible areas of research. 
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A rereading of the existing literature within the field 
of instructional aedla provides an excellent starting source 
of lnforaatlon with respect to category number one. In 
effect, this category addresses the physical aspects of 
aedla experience ranging fron staple concerns of elements of 
comfort, to the mechanlsa of stimulus varlatlon within a 
aultlmedla presentation. Even though such f lndlngs tend not 
to be expressed in psychoanalytic terms, some research 
conclusions are psychoanalytlcally valid. 
For instance, the physical design of the classroom must 
be conducive to conflict resolution In that lt must project 
pernissiveness, openness, and acceptance; that ls, to what-
ever extent ls practically possible, lt must not be an 
environment that offers potentially more sources of con-
fl lct. This openness aust be balanced with constraints, 
however, because lt aust be remembered that the development 
of the ego in the f lrst place was in reaction to the id. 
The individual should not have reason to believe that he's 
ln a place where he alght ·run wild.· How such a classroom 
aight actually be created ls the toplc of future research. 
If positlvlstic research has articulated sophisticated 
means for compelling and holding student interest for sone 
instructional objective, the question then focuses on 
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whether the experience of Instructional aedla ls benef lclal 
to the individual in terms of time taken away froa the 
developaental concerns of conflict resolution. Does it aake 
any difference if attention is deflected from such a task? 
Is the student better served by gaining soae relief froa the 
constant involvement with the conflict? Is conflict re-
solved in an entirely different manner so the physical 
demands of participation in instructional media offer no 
genuine barrier to development? 
Louise L. Tyler believes that the concept of Freudian 
conflict has strong implications for the selection of in-
12 structional materials and how those materials are used. 
Tyler argues that conflict resolution comes through active 
involvement in the resolution process by the individual, and 
that no matter how cleverly designed, media tends to promote 
passivity by virtue of the physical isolation <as in auto-
mated study carrels> or physical restraint <when watching 
films or video tapes>. If the natural state of the indivi-
dual is toward conflict resolution, then it ls necessary for 
the teacher to provide tools for the task in the form of in-
terpersonal relationships as opposed to prepackaged curric-
ulum media. The immediate conclusion is that as consumers 
of instructional aedia, students may gain •ore lnfor•atlon 
but not be aided appreciably in their efforts toward sta-
bi l lzatlon. Perhaps this ls especially laportant for 
laaature students whose progress toward maturity could be 
aeliorated with maxiaized one-on-one instruction. 
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Research for category two aay be aore difficult to 
accomplish. Internal experiences of conflict are unique to 
the individual, but generalizations aay be drawn fro• case 
studies and sociological Investigations that are useful for 
the field of instructional ~edla. For instance, David W. 
Johnson at the University of Minnesota has published exten-
sively concerning the social process of education. Johnson 
does not address the concept of conflict resolution direct-
ly, but his ideas discussed from this point of view are 
illuminating. He states that the primary focus of educa-
tional research should be on the social organization of the 
classroom because most learning is mediated by interpersonal 
13 
action. The efficiency of instruction ls enhanced if a 
good working relationship is established between the student 
and teacher via transference. In this way, conflict expert-
enced in another setting may be weakened in its effect if 
the teacher ls open to its resolution; otherwise, the con-
flict ls experienced internally only and its ultimate impact 
cannot be assessed. 
Johnson's work points the way for research into the 
iapact of instructional media as an indirect participant in 
conflict with his reference to transference. Recall that it 
is the intent of this paper to suggest that exploration of 
the role of instructional media in conflict is necessary. 
This does not, however, represent an atteapt to address the 
way in which this conflict might be resolved, for such com-
•ents lie far outside the scope and sophistication of the 
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work here. An overwhel•lng variety of provocative questions 
can be posed by mention of any of the defense mechanisms 
Freud identified. For exa•ple, with respect to transfer-
ence: Can an instructor introduce a particular production 
to effect transference? Can Instructional medla be used to 
facilitate transference at all? Would this be desirable? 
If not, ls the teacher justified in using media as an in-
direct block to conflict resolution if resolution means the 
personal involvement of an instructor whose stated role ls 
to impleaent the basic curriculum only?14 
Seymour Fox's 1975 publication of Freud 2Jl!.! Education 
offers an interesting variation on this exploration of de-
fense mechanisms with his description of the teacher as 
15 •polyvalent.• In the classroom the teacher represents 
collectively a signlf icant adult, society, society as seen 
by the child, and the source of knowledge. As a represen-
tative of society, for instance, the teacher is in a unique 
position to permit safe experimentation in dealing with 
society. By a similar process, the teacher can be cast in a 
fifth persona as parent who represents a potential for the 
student to experiment with the resolution of parental con-
flicts. In this way the intuitive teacher can permit exper-
iaentatlon in the resolution of the conflicts in a variety 
of ways depending upon the student's perception of the 
teacher at a given moment. Certainly such education would 
depend upon the student's ability to shift from one percep-
tion to another. Perhaps the effective use of instructional 
•edla could facilitate this process, if such were deeaed 
desirable. 
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Just as investigation in category two appears to be 
aore difficult than category one, the final category regard-
ing the direct participation of instructional media in 
conflict seems to be proportionately more difficult to 
investigate because of less clearly defined •mechanisms.• 
One clinical attempt to investigate the role of conflict in 
learning was reported in John Butler's essay concerning 
•repressive versus vigilant• individuals. Hls work offers 
some statistical evidence in an indirect way. 16 
In summary, two subjects were selected to take part in 
tests in associative learning. One of the subjects was 
interviewed before the test to identify a list of words 
particular to that individual that related in some way to 
conflict unique to that person. These words were then 
embedded in a larger list which was presented to both sub-
jects. The f lrst subject, the •repressive• Individual, 
scored significantly poorer than did the second subject, the 
•vtgllant• Individual. The Implication ls that information 
that relates to unresolved conflict tends to be processed in 
a less efficient manner than conflict-free material. Of 
particular interest is the fact that after a brief counsel-
ing session In which the repressive individual was aided ln 
resolving the conflict, his performance score more closely 
approximated that of the vigilant subject. 
Although far removed from pedagogy, Paulina F. Kern-
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berg's investigations regarding mother-child mirroring as a 
component ln the development of self-recognition may stimu-
late a line of research. Freud speculated that among the 
first conflicts in life were those involving the self as 
defined against the family members, especially the mother. 
Kernberg argues that the infant needs the •mirroring• of 
self in the face of the mother in order to foster an iden-
tlty independent of mother. In severe cases, therapy with 
young children who have failed to develop self-recognition 
may be helped by employing a mirror as a tool to aid the 
psychotherapeutic process. Hore important to this discus-
sion is the implication that the child with a distorted 
self-concept may seek a reflection of self in individuals 
encountered other than the mother. 
It ls as if the self comes to know itself by pro-
jecting itself onto others and then retrieving 
this image. Not only does one see an affective 
image of oneself in the other's face, but one also 
receives a reflection of more abstract character 
or personality attributes through this process of 
projection and introjection <Kernberg, 1984, 
p. 109). 
Kernberg notes that infants at five months of age can 
recognize themselves in video taped playbacks (though with 
less interest than with their mirror images>. This indi-
cates that it is possible for this mirroring to occur via 
recorded media, and this raises interesting prospects for 
instruction. If images of self are received however imper-
fectly from others, and if this is possible in a recorded 
format, to what extent ls an individual's self-concept in-
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fluenced by experiencing, say, broadcast televlslon? Can 
the appropriate selection of instructional media aid In 
clarifying self-iaages among students, that is, can lt 
participate directly ln the conflict experienced as a result 
of an imperfect self-concept? 
It aust be noted in conclusion that these implications 
are not offered in a cavalier sense nor are they meant to 
imply that the teacher should attempt an active investiga-
tion into conflict. To the contrary, perhaps the signifi-
cance of this paper for Instructional media lies in the 
realization that new understandings are necessary for the 
use of media in the classrooa. The nature of media may in 
soae manner thrust itself into Intensely personal areas of 
conflict occurring in personalities that are not yet sta-
bilized. Perhaps that intrusion can profoundly affect a 
child, but to presume to actively choose to interfere in the 
individual process of conflict resolution requires answers 
to psychological, educational, and ethical questions that 
have yet to be posed. Certain preliminary implications 
drawn froa research in social education suggest that through 
thoughtful design and planning the teacher can help to 
aitigate the painful effects of the conflict by under-
standing soae of the dynamics of the process and decrease 
inadvertent contributions to it. Until more research is 
coapleted, It appears that restraint In the use of media in 
favor of personal interaction whenever possible is the pru-
dent course of action. 
ENDNOTES 
1 
Freud's early experiments ln hypnosis as treat•ent for 
hysteria led to a conclusion that soae syMptoas were related 
to unconscious feelings that could be rediscovered. The 
classic study involved Anna O., a patient of Joseph Breuer. 
Freud published one of his first accounts of the •talking 
cure• jointly with Breur ln 1892. See Sigmund Freud, An. 
Autobiograohical Study, tr. JaMes Strachey <New York, 1963), 
pp. 32-36. Cf. Sigmund Freud, ~Origin ~ Deyelopment 2.f.. 
Psychoanalysis <Chicago, 1965), pp. 1-17. 
2By this it ls meant that, say, a fll• may be used as a 
coaponent of an instructional design scheme; presented as a 
source for Interpretation in a hermeneutic sense; or used as 
a trigger for dialogue. Cf. Paulo Freire, Pedagogy 2.f. .t.Wt. 
Oppressed <New York, 1962>. 
3 See Christopher J. Hurn, IWt Limits 2ll..Sl Possipllities 
Q.f. Schooling: An. Introdyction l2. ,t.Wt Sociology Q.f. Education 
<Boston, 1978>, pp. 30-31, for a critical examination of the 
functional, or traditional, paradigm of education in the 
United States, as compared to the •radical• paradigm. 
4 
Robert H. Gagne, ·oevelopaents ln Learning 
Psychology,• Educational Technology <June, 1982) pp. 11-15. 
5 See Linda Wheeler, ·successful Instructional Methods,· 
Educational Communication ~Technology, 29,4 <Winter, 
1981>, pp. 203-217. 
6see Robert Glaser, "Components of Psychology of 
Instruction: Towards a Science of Design,• Reyiew 2.f.. 
Education, 46, 1 (1976>, pp. 1-24. 
7see JaMes Strachey, tr., ·sigmund Freud: A Sketch of 
His Life and Ideas,• Qn. ~History !2.f.. .th.st. Psvcho-Analytic 
Movement by Sigmund Freud <New York, 1966>, pp. vil-x. 
8cf. Sigmund Freud, Beyond ~Pleasure Principle <New 
York, 1961>, 54: ·siology is truly a land of unll•ited 
possibilities. We may expect it to give us the most 
surprising information and we cannot guess what answers it 
will return in a few dozen years to the questions we have 
put to lt. They May ce of a klnd which will blow away the 
whole of our artificial structure of hypotheses.· 
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9An excellent suaaary of Freud's theories at the tlae 
of his death <his •final systea•> can be found In Calvin S. 
Hall, A Prlaer 2.L Freudian Psvchology <New York, 1954>. 
10 Ibld. This ls in reference to the period that a 
student ls lo public school. The tlae required for a person 
to develop through Freud's various periods to a stabilized 
personality requires approxlaately twenty years. 
11 see Clemens A. Loew, Three Psvchotheraoies <New York, 
1975>. 
12 see Louise L. Tyler, •curriculua Developaent from a 
Psychotheraputlc Perspective,• ~Psychologies Aoolled lg_ 
Education, ed. Thomas B. Roberts <New York, 1975), pp. 
55-61. 
13 see David W. Johnson, ·social Psychology,• Psychology 
~Education: ~State 2.L .t.b§. Union, ed. Frank H. Farlely 
and Neal J. Gordon <Berkeley, 1981>, pp. 265-287. 
14 cf. Lill E. Peller, •The School's Role In Promoting 
Sublimation,· ~Psychoanalytic Study 2f. ~Child, 11 
<1956), pp. 437-449. Cf. Velialr Svoren, H.D., Conflict awl 
it.§. Solution <New York, 1971>. 
15 Seymour Fox, Freud awl Education <Springfield, 1975>, 
pp. 163-166. 
16 John Butler, •prospects and Perspectives in 
Psychotheraputlc Theory and Research,· Learning Theory, 
Personality Theory, ~Clinical Research, ed. Donald K. 
Adams <New York, 1954>, p. 126. 
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APPENDIX 
FREUD'S THEORY OF PERSONALITY: 
A DEVELOPMENTAL VIEW 
Freud's theory of individual personality was linked 
systematically with the biological organism of human beings 
via the notion of lnstlncts. 1 For this reason, the follow-
ing treatment will proceed from a developmental point of 
view. Beginning with the infant as an individual possessing 
no guiding structures or mechanisms for dealing with the 
world other than its reflexes and instincts, the discussion 
will highlight some of the events le~dlng to the development 
of two additional systems that, in combination with the 
instincts, form the basis for the emergence of the stabi-
1 ized personality. It will be suggested that this twenty-
year process ls characterized by constant change and tension 
as the individual progresses through four stages of life: 
infancy, early chldhood, latency <the period of time between 
the ages of five and twelve when the child's sexual and 
aggressive impluses are in a subdued state> and adoles-
cence. 2 Finally, a brief review will be offered of some of 
the defense mechanisms employed at the site of the ego to 
control the instincts. 
At birth, the Infant ls equipped to interact with the 
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external world through a reflex apparatus that aids in the 
discharge of some of the energy, or •tension,• resulting 
from a stimulus to a sense organ. For instance, a bright 
light can create tension which is dispelled by a reflex that 
triggers the closing of the eyelid. If all tensions could 
be discharged by some reflex, there would be no need for 
psychological development, but such ls not the case. The 
hungry infant cannot discharge the stomach contractions 
automatically and the contractions lead to crying instead. 
In this case, the tension is discharged only by external 
assistance. 
Eventually, the parents begin to establish a schedule 
of feeding and initiate the first attempts at training and 
discipline. As the infant experiences alternating periods 
of frustration and satisfaction, the •td• ls formed. The 
sole function of the id is to provide for the immediate 
discharge of quantities of excitation (energy or tension> 
that are created in the organism by internal or external 
stimulation. 3 Stated more simply, it is that part of the 
personality made up of unconscious impulses and instincts 
that were born with the child. 
Freud postulated two great groups of instincts: those 
that are in the service of life CEros>; and those that are 
in the service of death CThanatos). The form of energy 
which is created by the life instinct ls called libido. It 
ls mental energy that ls directed toward the realization of 
some life-preserving impulse. This term ls often used in 
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specif lc reference to sexual energy, per Freud's exaaple ln 
earlier writings, but it ls used here in the broader sense 
as the energy of all life instincts. 
All energy for perforaing the work of the personality 
coaes from the instincts, and it ls important to note that 
an instinct has as a final aim the removal of a need, such 
as the elimination of hunger, and the ultimate restoration 
of a state of peace. Freud believed this dynamic concept to 
be an important end. In his terminology, the investment of 
an urging force emanating from the ld onto an external ob-
ject Is the •cathexls.• 
The id discharges tension in two ways: through impul-
s l ve motor activity and the formation of memory images, or 
•primary process.• If the id recalls an image of an object 
<a food item for instance> and temporarily reduces a tension 
<hunger> by concentrating on the image, then this ls an ex-
ample of the primary process. This process ls obviously in-
efficient; the personality needs additional structures in 
order to survive. 
As the infant matures there begins to develop a second 
system of the personality which Freud called the •ego.• In 
contrast to the id which ls governed by the pleasure prln-
c iple, the ego ls dominated by the reality principle. Its 
function is to mediate the transactions between the person 
and the world at large. It is what enables the child to 
begin to distinguish between the things that are harmful 
<not appropriate for cathexls> and which are safe. Some-
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tlaes, when the person wants to do something, and the ego 
prevents it, the individual experiences Internal frustra-
tlon. The checking force operating ln opposition to the 
cathexls ls the antl-cathexis and represents a primary 
source of conflict. 
One of the most variable features of an instinct ls the 
shlftlng from one object that ls not appropriate for cathex-
is to another. The process of rechanneling psychological 
energy ls called displacement and ls a coaaon means of 
conflict resolution. For instance, one of the earliest 
pleasurable actlvitles that the child experiences ls asso-
ciated with taking food and sucking. As the parents regu-
late the feeding schedule, the child learns to suck hls own 
finger to reproduce the sensation of sucking at his mother's 
breast; and later appears to interpret the world by using 
his mouth. Freud suggested that the development of person-
allty proceeds in large part by a series of energy displace-
ments or object substitutions. The aim of the urging force 
4 remains the same, only the object changes. 
The pleasure of sucking is followed by the discovery of 
other enjoyable actlvltles. As the parents attempt to regu-
late the child's wetting and dirtying of diapers, the 
child's attention is directed to the anus and he becomes 
aware of new pleasures associated with self-regulation of 
5 
his bowel movements. As toilet training proceeds, the 
child discovers his genitals and the pleasures possible 
through self-stlmulatlon. Freud argues that such activities 
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are important for the lndlvldual's sexual aaturatlon, and 
the resulting conflict with the parents plays a role in the 
foraatlon of the third system of the personality, the super-
ego. 
Given the long period of dependence on the parents, the 
child experiences repeated conflicts with them. In time, 
the child learns to adopt the exacting set of rules and 
standards they hold. This identification with the parents 
results in the formation of the superego out of the ego. It 
ls like the ego in that it stems from the individual's per-
ception of the world, but ls different in that it ls not 
based on the reality principle; rather, it reflects an 
idealized impression of the all-powerful parents. 
The superego can be thought of as the moral component 
of the personality and ls, in a very real sense, an exten-
sion of the child's parents, vested with the same power. 
The parents exert control over the development of the super-
ego with a combination of rewards and punishments expressed 
physically and psychologically. Physically, rewards and 
punishments are expressed by giving or removing food, toys, 
swats, caresses, and the like. Psychologically, rewards and 
punishments are expressed through the giving or removing of 
love, protection or acceptance. The superego exerts its 
control over the ego in essentially the same way through its 
two main subsystems: the ego-ideal, which corresponds to 
what the parents believe ls morally good; and the con-
science, which corresponds to what the parents believe ls 
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morally bad. The superego functions In effect by permitting 
the industrious individual a vacation <physical reward> and 
a sense of pride <psychological reward> while the lazy lndl-
vidual may get a stomach ache <physical punishment> and feel 
gulllty <psychological punishment>. 
It is interesting to note that rewards or punishments 
are not based solely on expressed acts. The ego may be re-
warded or punished for a mere thought. Thus, conflict can 
occur In the absence of any overt stimulation. The subtle 
interplay of actions on the ego by the superego may happen 
at a level of thought that is not obvious to the individual. 
This could account for feelings of guilt or elation that an 
individual may experience which seem inappropriate to a 
6 given situation. Freud suggests the fascinating lmpllca-
tion that very little that the individual experiences ls by 
accident; rather, it ls a result of the manipulations of the 
superego that lead the individual to apparently fortuitous 
7 
situations or runs of bad luck. In the final analysis it 
appears that rewards and punishments, whatever their sources 
may be, are conditions that reduce or increase inner 
8 
tension. 
Like the ego, the superego possesses both cathexes and 
anti-cathexes and influences the object selections of the 
ego. In some cases, the compromises made by the ego because 
of influences in the external environment coupled with the 
superego can result in a displacement that represents a 
higher cultural goal. This ls called •sublimation.· In a 
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broad sense, subllmatlon represents the ability to transfora 
basic instinctual urges into needs that can be filled sym-
bolically. 9 
It may be noted here that a more precise investigation 
of the earliest stages of personality development ls ham-
pered by what Freud called ·infantile amnesia.· 10 The 
ability to remember the earliest events of life varies 
somewhat from individual to individual, but generally 
speaking, humans have no clear memory of their earl lest 
impressions. These first years are characterized by a 
profound helplessness and dependency which ultimately 
determines the individual's destiny. Freud suggests that 
certain events occur during this time which are highly 
traumatic, and the act of forgetting may be an act of 
defense. Anna Freud suggested the following scenario. 
The child at a very early age develops strong ties to 
his mother, and it is logical to assume that the child 
11 
becomes interested in maintaining this state of affairs. 
The bond transcends the child's feelings of hunger or 
fright; a love develops that is independent of the instincts 
of self-preservation. The child would probably be content 
if the mother did nothing but tend to his needs and love 
him. 
By the end of the first year, however, the child has 
become aware of the fact that the world includes others who 
intrude upon the exclusivity of his relationship with his 
mother. The other family members, typically the father and 
1 1 1 
siblings, appear to be just as important as he thinks him-
self. The resulting jealousy leads to an undifferentiated 
wish, presumably violent, to eliminate the rivals for the 
mother's attention. 
As time passes, the child's anger begins to assume two 
distinct forms. The first comes from the realization that 
the mother loves the siblings and that the child ls en-
couraged to dismiss the feelings of anger and love the 
siblings as well. Anna Freud suggested that this ls the 
source of conflict between siblings, and that the stronger 
the earliest ties are between mother and child, the stronger 
ls the likelihood of conflict between siblings in later 
12 years. 
The other form of anger ls directed toward the father. 
Not only ls this person a rival for the mother's attention, 
he clearly has won the competition as evidenced by his 
ability to take the mother away and even to sleep with her. 
The desire to eliminate the father and possess the mother 
Freud labeled as the Oedipus complex. In all other re-
spects, however, the child admires and loves the father 
which leads to an extraordinary problem: the child loves and 
admires a person he hates and wishes dead. Freud proposed 
that this early conflict results in agony at the strength of 
his evil wishes, fear of his father's revenge and the loss 
of love, the destruction of all ease and peace in his rela-
tions with his mother, his bad conscience, and his mortal 
dread of death.13 
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The lndlvldual experiences this agony as anxiety, one 
of the central features of psychoanalytic theory. For 
Freud, anxiety ls synonymous with fear, but he used the term 
•anxiety• to distinguish It from the lay understanding of 
fear as something that results from a threat external to the 
14 
individual. Freud Identified three categories of anxiety. 
The first he called reality anxiety and stems from a genuine 
danger to the individual from the external world, such as a 
physical assault. The second is neurotic anxiety and comes 
from an instinctual object-choice Ccathexis> of the id. 
This is exemplified by the person who experiences almost 
uncontrollable urges which could lead to harm if pursued. 
Finally, Freud ldentlf led moral anxiety. This ls experi-
enced as deep guilt or shame in the ego created by the con-
science In the superego. In essence, the ego experiences 
anxiety as a fear of the external world, the id, and the 
superego. These anxieties are also primary sources of con-
15 
flict. 
With the development of the personality comes the ap-
pearance of mechanisms for dealing with the anxiety. Five 
of the more important ones are reviewed below. 
If a cathexls of the Id, ego or superego ls blocked by 
an anti-cathexis, the resulting anxiety can be avoided by 
the prevention of the conflict from being expressed in the 
consciousness. This Freud labeled as •repression• and he 
identif led two categories. The f lrst ls •primal repression• 
which refers to innate object choices that have never been 
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conscious but are common to all persons. The second ls 
•repression proper• <or simply •repression•> and is con-
cerned with those conflicts specific to the individual. The 
concept of repression ls of central importance for this 
paper for It ls the process by which Infantile amnesia 
occurs. Note that even though a memory ls repressed, it 
retains its ability to create conflict. 
•projection• occurs when an individual experiencing 
anxiety caused by the id or superego attributes it to an 
external source. A person angry with himself may project 
the anger onto another person by claiming, •tte hates me.· 
An explanation for this may be that external problems are 
perceived as less complex or potentially frightening than 
internal conflicts, and may be easier to solve. This could 
also explain why individuals seem to seek external explana-
tions for their behavior rather than experience the anxiety 
17 of introspection. 
When an instinct creates anxiety directly on the ego or 
indirectly by way of the superego, a defense may take the 
form of a •reaction formation• which is the outward expres-
sion of an opposite feeling. A person who hates another but 
cannot express that hate may choose to demonstrate love in~ 
stead. In this case, ·1ove• ls distinguished from ·1ove re-
sultlng from a reaction formation• by the latter's rigidity 
and excessive profession. 
As suggested earlier, there are four broad stages of 
human development. If for some reason, movement from one 
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stage to another, or development wlthln a glven stage, ls 
perceived as a change that can produce considerable anxiety, 
the Individual may slaply refuse to take the next step. 
This is labeled as •fixation,• and ls at work in the indivi-
dual who refuses to separate from his mother. It ls usually 
not so much a result of strong ties of love as it is a fear 
of moving on without the mother's protection. In this 
sense, fixation is a defense mechanism. 
Just as a person may refuse to move on, the experience 
of anxiety may cause an individual to move back to an 
earlier stage of development. This ls called •regression,• 
and can be seen in the actions of a newlywed who rushes back 
to his parents at the f lrst sign of dlff iculty. It may be 
thought of as a reverting of the libido to a form of expres-
18 
sion that belonged to an earlier stage of life. 
Thus, what appears on the surface as a protracted 
period of helplessness during the time of infancy and early 
childhood is a period of helplessness only in the sense of 
the individual's limited ability to direct specific respon-
ses to the external world. Internally, he experiences an 
astonishing variety of complex emotions and Impressions 
largely represented as frustrations and conflicts that re-
sult In the formation of the personality and its sophisti-
cated defenses. 
One final thought is in order. It is interesting to 
note that the developaent of the superego at approxl•ately 
age five corresponds roughly with the onset of the second 
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stage of development that Freud called •1atency.• This 
period ls marked by a pronounced drop in llbldlnal energy 
<presumably a function of maturation> that lasts approxi-
mately seven years until the beginning of adolescence. The 
latency period ls characterized by Its subdued state during 
which the child~s sexual and aggressive impulses are re-
placed by what appears to be a child who •f tnally learned 
how to be good.· Perhaps it is more than mere coincidence 
that this ls typically the point that marks the beginning of 
public education. 
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